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ABSTRACT 
 
The utilisation of navigation systems in cars has given rise to road safety 
concerns, and the design and functionality of such systems must therefore 
be adjusted to the users’ needs, since they have to divide their attention 
between driving and the operation of the navigation system. The study was 
aimed at finding the optimum system response time (SRT) which would 
enable a driver to focus as much as possible on the road while attaining an 
efficient task completion time using an electronic navigational system. The 
research project consists of two separate experiments and was completed by 
10 subjects. Experiment 1 included a temporal reproduction task and a 
secondary memory task. The subjects had to memorise two symbols and 
then reproduce six time spans ranging from 1 to 30 s to provide a baseline 
measurement of their time estimation abilities. Experiment 2 consisted of a 
simulated automobile driving task. While driving in the simulator the subjects 
completed a memorising task displayed on a touch screen. The task was 
presented with seven different system response times (SRTs) ranging from 0 
to 30 s. The effects of different SRTs on the eye movement from road to 
monitor, regarding the duration of fixation and the frequency of change were 
evaluated. The distribution of gazes to the secondary task was analysed to 
provide information about the time estimation performance in the driving 
simulator. Other dependent variables tested were the accuracy of selected 
items, memory game performance, drive performance and the subjective 
state of the test person. The results of this study can be employed to find the 
optimum duration of inter-task delays for in-vehicle technical devices. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Electronic innovations are changing the demands placed on drivers of motor 
vehicles, and support, or may even partly release the driver from, the driving 
task. Examples of such systems are collision warning systems, autonomous 
cruise control (ACC) and electronic handling control systems. Furthermore, 
drivers have recourse to new navigation and traffic information systems 
(Bullinger & Dangelmaier, 2003). Subscribers to premium telematics services 
can even take advantage of sophisticated features such as verbal e-mail 
messages, digital music, tailored traffic and weather updates as well as on-
demand news, sports and stock market reports (Ashley, 2001). 
 
Even though these systems are aimed at providing assistance to the driver, 
they also have a negative aspect. Technical systems that need input from 
the driver while driving are a source of distraction. Thus, some navigation 
systems require on-the-move destination entry whereby the driver needs to 
perform a series of data entry steps. Prohibiting the use of these systems is 
not feasible because that hinders the development of new design solutions 
based on a dual-task paradigm, in which electronic devices are developed to 
assist in the driving task (Burnett, Summerskill & Porter, 2004). Kamp and 
his colleagues Martin-Lamettet, Frozy and Causeur (2001) conducted a study 
to assess various control interfaces of an in-vehicle Internet browser offering 
services such as district map, route planning, electronic messaging, leisure 
programs and a phone directory. The subjects used keyboards, touch pads 
and voice commands as control devices. The assessment criteria of this 
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experiment were speed, distance to target vehicle, lane position, and visual 
activity. The functioning of the system, operating time and error rate were 
recorded, and a post-trial questionnaire was used to obtain input from the 
subjects. The results of the study indicated that browsing while driving is 
complicated and dangerous, even when using a simplified browser. The 
results also showed that different control devices were not equally efficient, 
and that their efficiency varied in terms of the task that had to be executed 
(Kamp, Martin-Lamettet, Frozy & Causeur, 2001).  
 
Tsimhoni and Green (2001) conducted a study focusing on the attentional 
demands experienced by subjects who were required to perform a driving 
task while completing a display-intensive in-vehicle task. They compared the 
driving performance of their subjects during straight and curved road 
conditions of various degrees while performing a map-reading task of short, 
medium and long duration. While they were driving, the subjects engaged in 
a constant switching process between the road and the task. The results 
showed that the mean glance duration decreased and the gaze frequency 
rose as the curve radius increased, demanding more visual attention. The 
researchers concluded that test subjects did not maintain risk homeostasis 
since test subjects’ driving performance decreased as visual demand 
increased. It was found that the drivers drifted more in the lane or even left 
it as driving conditions became more difficult. An insignificant increase in 
task completion time under increased visual demand indicated that subjects 
gave up driving safety for the sake of fast task completion.  
 
The result of this study clearly showed that drivers are distracted when 
operating technical devices while driving. In future the number of technical 
gadgets available to drivers will increase and therefore research evaluating 
the impact of these devices on driving performance is of great importance. 
Hence, the process of resource allocation must be taken into consideration 
when investigating optimal system response times (SRTs) for software 
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programs used in environments that place high cognitive demands on the 
operator. 
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH AIMS 
 
 
The study was divided into two parts, involving two separate experiments. 
The purpose of the first experiment was to determine whether the test 
subjects had normal time estimation abilities. Numerous factors such as 
mental and neurological disorders and stress can influence a person’s 
temporal perception. In addition, affective factors and age influence the 
subjective experience of time (Eisler, 1993 & Friedman, 1990). The first 
experiment provided insight into the subjects’ performance under dual-task 
conditions with a simple secondary task and served as a baseline 
measurement of the subjects’ time estimation abilities. 
 
The second experiment consisted of a simulated driving task in a static 
driving simulator.  While driving the subjects were asked to play a memory 
game that was displayed on a touch screen mounted to the right of the 
steering wheel to imitate the operation of an on-board navigation system. 
The subjects were forced to divide their attention between the road and the 
game monitor. The glances from the road to the monitor gave an indication 
of how accurate the currently tested SRT was estimated by the test subject. 
An SRT can be defined as the time that elapses from entering a command 
until the computer is ready to process a new command. If the SRT was 
underestimated numerous glances from the road to the game monitor were 
performed before the SRT had elapsed. Therefore the resulting gaze 
frequency for the various SRTs was evaluated by means of this experiment. 
The distribution of the control gazes during each SRT was also analysed. The 
average focus time on the game monitor was also examined since the time 
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periods that are spent not focusing on the road have a negative impact on 
driving safety. 
 
Driving performance was another important focus point of the study since 
the findings provided information regarding the effects of SRT on traffic 
safety. Another aspect considered was the subjective state of the subjects, 
since the well-being of the user can have a significant influence on 
motivation and efficient task completion, which in turn can influence overall 
driving performance (Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese & Manfredini, 1997).  
 
Further questions that were addressed by this study concerned the influence 
of SRT on the memory performance and subjective state of the test subjects. 
The accuracy of the selected items in the memory game provided an 
indication of how severely these performance parameters were influenced by 
the magnitude of the cognitive load. The subjects needed to remember four 
items at the same time in the memory game and had to recall them in the 
pre-established order. Therefore, the results also provided insight into the 
effects of a multiple-task environment on memory performance. After 
carrying out a session in the driving simulator with a certain SRT the 
subjects were asked what influence each delay time had on the process of 
task completion and on their driving performance. The subjects were also 
questioned about the amount of stress and boredom they experienced during 
the experiment with regard to the different SRTs. This information about 
subjective factors was collected in order to establish which SRT was the most 
agreeable to the test subjects. 
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1.3 MOTIVATION FOR CONDUCTING THE STUDY 
 
 
During the design of computer interfaces for automobiles, the focus changes 
from road to monitor need to be considered since unnecessary checking of 
the screen while waiting for the system to respond can cause the driver to 
spend less time focusing on the road. The study was aimed at finding the 
optimum SRT that permits users to focus as much as possible on the road 
while also achieving an efficient task completion time. An optimum SRT 
between independent (sub) tasks enables the user to achieve the ideal 
readiness for the subsequent task execution. However, one difficulty in 
determining the optimal SRT is that there are two types of SRT. In intra-task 
SRTs there are dependencies between the user‘s responses to the different 
stimuli, and the user may need to keep a provisional result in his or her 
memory which is then used as input to the next subtask. In inter-task delay 
SRTs there are no such dependencies between the responses to the stimuli. 
In this study intra-task SRTs ranging from 0 to 30 s were used to include 
short, medium and long durations. 
 
 
1.4 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
 
The study is subdivided into five chapters. Chapter 1 gives an introduction to 
the topic and presents the research aims and problems. Chapter 2 first 
describes the nature of time itself and then looks at the neural presentation 
of time within the human brain. Overviews of the factors known to influence 
temporal perception along with various laws and models that try to explain 
the phenomenon of temporal perception are presented in this chapter. The 
influence that performing multiple concurrent tasks can have on attention, 
time estimation and memory is also highlighted. At the end of this chapter, 
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the hypotheses of the study are set out, accompanied by the corresponding 
research findings. 
 
Chapter 3 gives an outline of the research methodology and the research 
design. In addition, the sample, the measuring instruments, the method of 
data collection and the statistical methods that were employed are included 
in this chapter. Chapter 4 presents the results of the statistical analysis 
performed on the data yielded by the two experiments. Chapter 5 provides a 
discussion of the research findings and a summary of the conducted 
research. The practical implications of the research findings and their 
influence on further research are also included in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
The sense of time differs significantly from all people’s other senses and can 
only be observed in an indirect way. A general discussion of the neural 
representation of time is provided, extending to the functional parts in the 
brain that are involved in the processing or storage of temporal information. 
The ‘window of simultaneity’ is also discussed, which explains how the brain 
integrates information from different sensory modalities into one coherent 
moment (Pöppel, 1988). Factors influencing the process of temporal 
perception are then described. These include mental and neurological 
disorders, age, stress and drugs as well as affective factors, as well as the 
effect of stress and other subjective factors such as boredom.   
 
The laws and models of temporal processing are also discussed to highlight 
the difficulties in finding a common law or model that could explain the 
variations in the production and reproduction of temporal intervals. Particular 
attention is devoted to Weber’s law, which has been widely applied to 
temporal perception and Vierordt’s law which addresses the process of 
duration estimation. In addition, an overview of the basic models of temporal 
processing is given, including clock- and memory-based models as well as 
the scalar timing model (SET), which combines clock- and memory-based 
models (Gibbon, 1977). 
 
To provide an understanding of the cognitive process involved in the 
completion of the conducted experiments in this study an overview of the 
basic concepts of attention, perception and memory is given. This is 
necessary to provide an understanding of the attentional limits that exist 
when performing a task that includes numerous sub tasks. The human 
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information processing-capacity is limited by people’s working memory 
capacity and can be negatively influenced by concurrently processed 
information. Various models try to give an explanation of the phenomenon of 
dual-task inference, and some of the relevant theories and models are 
discussed, such as Broadbent’s (1958) filter theory, the sensory store and 
channel theory by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968), the attenuation theory of 
Treisman (1963) and the limited capacity models of attention by Kahneman 
(1973). Models depicting the internal processing of perceived data such as 
the bottleneck model (Pashler, 1984) and the capacity-sharing model and 
the crosstalk theory (Sternberg, 2003) are also mentioned.
 
 The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the theoretical standpoint that was adopted in 
the study and describes the various research questions that were 
investigated. 
 
2.1 THE NATURE OF TIME 
 
 
The understanding of how to define time has undergone significant changes 
since the introduction of the theory of relativity by Einstein. Prior to this, 
according to Newtonian physics, physical time was seen as an independent 
quantity.  It was believed that absolute time existed within absolute space 
and therefore that time stayed constant throughout cosmic space. The 
theory of relativity linked time with space in four-dimensional space-time. 
Physical time is regarded as a stream of irreversible change running through 
physical space. Space-time itself is a-temporal physical space where change 
run and the duration of change can be measured with clocks. The theory of 
relativity cannot be imagined without gravitational ether which is non 
homogeneous and has no autonomous existence but depends on the field 
generating matter (Sorli & Sorli, 2004a).Through the introduction of 
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gravitational ether into physical space, physical space is no longer of 
constant density. It now corresponds to the density of matter. The density of 
physical space is measured in GR (General Relativity) based on the curvature 
of space. The gravitational force of an ‘area’ depends on its density of 
physical space. Gravitational forces attract one another directly via physical 
space, unlike the three other basic forces (electromagnetic force and weak 
and strong nuclear forces), which rely on particles or waves to travel through 
physical space. The gravitational forces between dense matters are created 
instantly and they are therefore a-temporal (Sorli & Sorli, 2004b). 
 
The gravitational forces humans are exposed to have an effect on their brain 
functions. In weightlessness the spinal ganglia neurons of the hypothalamic 
nuclei reduce their production of arginine, vasopressin and certain growth 
hormone-releasing factors. The somatosensory cortex and spinal ganglia 
undergo structural changes due to a decreased afferent flow to the 
somatosensory cortex. These structural changes are necessary to cope with 
the neuron hypoactivity experienced under microgravity (Krasnov, 1994).  
According to Penrose (1994) and Hameroff (1994), the gravitational force of 
physical space is a basis for human consciousness, acting on the mass of 
neurons and their microtubule networks.  
 
Penrose even suggests that these microtubules may be responsible for the 
emergence of consciousness, and that the process is fundamentally related 
to the influence of quantum gravity within the tubules. Physical space and 
gravitational force are a temporal and therefore, the consciousness emerging 
in them can also be a-temporal, explaining why feelings of ‘timelessness’ and 
‘spaciousness’ are so commonly experienced  (Penrose, 1994, pp. 369-377). 
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2.2 THE NEURAL REPRESENTATION OF TIME 
 
 
One of the most elusive concepts still remaining for the field of neurobiology 
is the representation of temporal information because there are no dedicated 
sensors for time as there are for the five human senses, including vision and 
audition. The phenomenon of time perception with regard to its underlying 
neurobiological functions is best conceptualised in terms of the three 
concepts of duration, succession and temporal perspective (Block, 1990). 
The memory for duration refers to the memory for the persistence of an 
event or the interval between time periods or certain events. The sequential 
occurrence and the memory with regard to the relative regency or temporal 
order of events are handled by the memory for succession. 
 
The memory for time perspective can be mediated by the use of 
retrospective and prospective strategies and it is based on the memory 
derived from the past, present and future. As time markers for the memory 
representation of these three different temporal features, space, response, 
affect, sensory perception and language are employed. The hippocampus 
and interconnected neural circuits are assumed to mediate the temporal 
aspects of memory (Meck, Church & Olton, 1984). It is further posited by 
some neuroscientists that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and 
interconnected neural circuits mediate the temporal attribute within the data-
based memory system. In addition to these vital functional parts within the 
human brain, anatomical connections exist between the hippocampus and 
prefrontal cortex, which aid in the representation and processing of temporal 
information (Ferino, Thierry & Glowinski, 1987). 
 
Numerous studies have addressed the role of the cerebellum as an internal 
clock. The cerebellum has been hypothesised to operate as an internal clock 
that serves to precisely time the temporal relationships between events in 
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both the motor and perceptual domains (Ivry & Keele, 1989). Anatomical 
connections have been identified between the dentate nucleus of the 
cerebellum and the prefrontal cortex. Patients with neocerebellar lesions 
were found to have impaired performance in tests requiring planning and 
mental fluency.  In addition to this, an increased variability during a 
repetitive tapping task has been reported in patients with neocerebellar 
lesions (Ivry, 1996; Mangels, Ivry & Shimizu, 1998; Nichelli, Always & 
Grafmanet, 1996).  
 
In a series of three experiments, Mangels and his co-workers (1998) tried to 
separate the role of the cerebellum and the prefrontal cortex by comparing 
patients with unilateral cerebellar or prefrontal lesions with the help of a time 
discrimination task consisting of 400-ms and 4-s intervals. The results 
showed that neocerebellar damage impaired timing in the millisecond and 
the second ranges. Prefrontal lesions resulted in deficits in the estimation of 
longer duration and impairment in the working memory. The findings 
indicate that the frontal lobe is necessary for memory and attention and is 
therefore required in all timing tasks. The prefrontal cortex further provides 
supportive functions regarding the acquisition, maintenance, supervision as 
well as the organisation of temporal intervals in working memory.  
 
The brain also has to register self-continuity in time and must enable the 
individual to perceive his or her own ongoing existence. Given that the 
sensory systems work in this temporal manner, the sense of a continued 
existence must be supplied by some part of the brain. The sense of self-
continuity can be regarded as a very primitive requirement and extends well 
beyond human beings, since almost all organisms have to have a continuing 
awareness of self in both space and time (Hume, 1739). The continuity 
function is believed to be located in a part of the primitive brain, the limbic 
system and has been observed to be temperature dependent (Hancock, 
1993; Matell & Meck, 2000; Treisman, 1999).  
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The system that permits temporal continuity also possesses a counter-part 
located in the frontal lobes. This system allows the individual to go ‘faster 
than time’ and enables the individual to construct numerous ‘what-if’ 
scenarios and therefore makes it possible to process time in a proactive 
mode (Hancock, Szalma & Oron-Gilad, 2005). This observation essentially 
implies that the primary function of memory is not recording the past but, 
the storing of information. The stored memory can be regarded as the tool 
that the brain uses to construct useful ‘what-if’ scenarios for the future 
(Staddon, 2005). According to Dennett (1991), Hawkins and Blakeslee 
(2004) the human brain can be regarded as an anticipation machine. 
 
 
2.2.1 The window of simultaneity 
 
 
The general experience of seeing lightning before hearing the associated 
thunder reveals the discrepancy in human perception of a synchronous, 
though distant, multisensory event. The underlying reason for this 
phenomenon lies in the physical differences in the relative time of arrival of 
stimuli at the eye and ear. Light travels at about 300 000 000 metres per 
second, and this is a significantly higher speed than that of sound, which 
only progresses at about 340 metres per second at sea level, but differences 
in arrival time with respect visual and auditory information for events in 
one’s vicinity are generally unnoticed (Pöppel, 1988). This can be explained 
by looking at the way the incoming sensory information is processed since 
the mechanical transduction of sound waves at the ear is faster than the 
chemical transduction of light at the retina (King & Palmer, 1985). These 
physical and biophysical differences in the arrival time of light and sound 
cancel each other out at a distance of approximately 10 metres where the 
receiver is placed in a so-called ‘horizon of simultaneity’ (Pöppel, 1988).  
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The continued perception of multisensory synchrony is achieved by two 
alternative means, according to recent research. Psychophysical data 
reported by Sugita and Suzuki (2003) suggest that the window for 
multisensory temporal integration actually also moves farther away as 
audiovisual stimuli become more distant from people. In this way it allows 
for the fact that sound will increasingly lag behind vision with increasing 
distance. An alternative account comes from Morein-Zamir, Soto-Faraco and 
Kingstone (2003). They contend that the multisensory perception of 
simultaneity is occasionally upheld by our ability to ventriloquise visual 
stimuli across time into temporal alignment with later presented auditory 
stimuli. Additionally, the phenomenon of temporal ventriloquism is involved 
in the synchronisation of the rate at which sensory events are perceived to 
occur. 
 
Pöppel (1988; 1997) hypothesises about the existence of a temporal 
integration mechanism in the brain that integrates the sequences of events 
into one ‘gestalt’. The mechanism makes decisions concerning which event is 
graded as now and which events count as non simultaneous or as 
successive. To study the phenomenon of temporal integration, Pöppel 
exposed his test subjects to tones lasting for 1 ms. If the left and right ears 
were stimulated simultaneously the two tones were fused together into one 
stimulus by the test subject. Up to a fusion threshold of 2 ms the two tones 
were regarded as simultaneous. Past this threshold subjects perceived two 
separate tones. One interesting finding of this experiment was that only at 
intervals of around 20 ms were the subjects able to tell which click came 
first. The window of simultaneity also varies individually, ranging from 2 ms 
to 5 ms. Experimental evidence further proved that older people fuse more 
events together than younger people. The minimum threshold duration for 
the simultaneous integrating of sensory information is relatively fixed and 
cannot be modified by practice. Values of 20 ms for vision and 10 ms for 
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tactile sense have been found, but these values can vary slightly from person 
to person (Euler, 1997; Pöppel, 1988). 
 
The underlying causes of the large individual differences in the perception of 
multisensory synchrony were further examined by Stone, Hunkin, Porrill, 
Wood, Keeler, Beanland, Port and Porter (2001). They found dramatic 
individual differences, which were robust across testing sessions. The 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) at which people were most likely to judge 
sound and vision as being synchronous ranged from sounds preceding vision 
by 20 ms to vision leading by as much as 150 ms (Spence, Shore & Klein, 
2001). These differences in multisensory perception were first noted by 
astronomers more than 200 years ago and were formalised by the notion of 
the ‘personal equation’. This led to the very foundation of experimental 
psychology (Mollon & Perkins, 1996). 
 
 
2.2.2 Temporal integration 
 
 
Experimental evidence has confirmed that the neuro-cognitive machinery 
runs on two separate temporal processing systems. The first is a high-
frequency processing system operating at a 30-ms threshold. By studying 
temporal order thresholds it has been established that data picked up within 
a time window of 30 ms are treated as co-temporal and therefore distinct 
events need a minimum temporal distance of 30 ms to be regarded as 
successive. Neural oscillations with a period of 30 ms are initiated after the 
transduction of a stimulus (Madler & Pöppel 1987; Schwender, Klasing, Peter 
& Pöppel, 1994).  
 
A variety of studies using qualitatively different paradigms provide evidence 
for the existence of distinct processing stages. Under stationary experimental 
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conditions, response distributions of reaction times (Harter & White, 1968) 
and of pursuit (Pöppel & Logothetis, 1986) indicate multi-modal 
characteristics with a 30-ms separation of distinct response modes. These 
multi-modalities present an explanatory basis for the existence of neuronal 
oscillations. After the transduction of a stimulus, a relaxation oscillation with 
the duration of 30 ms is initiated. The relaxation oscillator is then triggered 
instantaneously by the stimulus. The oscillator is phase locked to that one 
stimulus and allows the integration of information from different sensory 
modalities to define a basic system state that functions as a building block of 
conscious activity (Pöppel, 1997). The temporal order analysis of the speech 
signal can be regarded as the basis for the identification of this phenomenon, 
and a disturbance of temporal acuity has been strongly linked to language 
disorders such as aphasia and other language impairments (Tallal, Miller & 
Fitch 1993).  
 
The neural oscillation system provides the basis for the temporal integration 
window. The phenomenon of temporal integration was studied by Wundt in 
1911 with the help of subjective accentuation of metronome beats where the 
subject had to impose a subjective structure onto identical physical events. 
The auditory stimuli consisted of click sounds in this experiment. If the 
sounds follow each other with an interval of one second the subjects are able 
to impose a subjective structure by giving a subjective interpretation to 
every second of the stimuli. When presented with long temporal gaps, 
temporal binding of the temporally adjacent stimuli is no longer possible and 
the two separate sequential stimuli are not incorporated into one percept 
(Wundt, 1911). The result indicated a maximum value of approximately 2.5 s 
for the successive integration windows. 
 
Subsequently the duration of the subjective present has been assessed by 
numerous experiments in the domains of temporal perception, proper 
movement control, speech, vision, audition as well as memory.  Some visual 
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stimuli, such as the three-dimensional Necker cube, can be given two 
different perceptual interpretations. In the case of the Necker cube, an 
automatic shift in perceptual content takes place every 3 s (Gomez, 
Argandona, Solier, Angulo & Vazquez, 1995; Schleidt & Kien 1997). The 
same phenomenon is found with auditory stimuli.  When subjects are 
instructed to synchronise a regular sequence of finger taps the accuracy of 
the stimulus anticipation is only provided up to an inter-stimulus interval of 3 
s and thereafter the tap movements become irregular. This suggests that the 
segmentation is based on an automatic and pre semantic integration process 
that provides a temporal platform for conscious activity and that every 2 to 3 
s an endogenously generated ‘question’ arises for new information from the 
external or internal environment.  
 
Studies of brain-injured patients indicate the involvement of the frontal brain 
regions in the temporal integration process. Lesions in the right frontal lobe 
led to a longer temporal integration while lesions in the left frontal lobe had 
the opposite effect and shortened the integration interval. These findings led 
to the suggestion that an inter-hemispheric push-pull mechanism operates 
between the two homologous frontal regions. This mechanism controls any 
tendency towards temporal dilation by contra-lateral temporal processing 
and leads to a long-term stabilisation of the temporal integration interval 
(Pöppel, 1997). 
 
 
2.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING TEMPORAL PERCEPTION 
 
 
Nature itself shows the existence of temporal regularities including short and 
long time cycles. The type of time as it exists in nature is referred to as 
‘natural time’ by Nelson (1996). From natural time it is possible to construct 
a more abstract idea about time. Time is not a phenomenon that can be 
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experienced directly since humans do not possess a sensory organ that is 
specialised for the measurement of time. The five senses, which include 
seeing, hearing, taste, smell and touch, receive their information through 
receptors adjusted to the stimulus they are meant to process. Since there 
are no receptors that would enable humans to sense time, time can only be 
observed in an indirect way.  
 
The notion that subjective time is related to the information-processing rate 
of the individual has been introduced a century ago by psychologists and has 
in recent years received support from some cosmologists. It involves two 
assumptions:  first, that subjective time is based upon the overall 
information processing rate and, second, that the subjective experience of 
life’s duration is related to, if not based on, the total information processed, 
also called the ‘cumulative uncertainty’ (Davies 1994). Thus, the faster one 
processes information and the more information one accrues, the more one 
has experienced in life and the greater will be the subjective experience of 
time for those events.  
 
Conversely, if a person processes small amounts of information there will be 
little subjective experience of time having passed. In the current 
astrophysical environment, proper time is presumably accepted as the 
appropriate measure of time because the information-processing rate of 
humans is directly proportional to proper time (Tipler & Barrow, 1986). In 
other words, one second of subjective time corresponds fairly well with one 
second of ‘external’ time. In mathematics and physics, the number of bits 
processed per second is a system’s information-processing rate. In 
psychology, however, most evidence indicates that chunks (meaningful 
units) instead of bits (mathematical units) are critical in human information 
processing and memory and that the amount of processed information is 
used as an indicator for the passage of time (Gruber, Wagner, Block & 
Matthews, 2000).  
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The personal idea of time or ‘personal experiential time’ by Nelson (1996) 
includes, amongst others, the concepts of sequence and duration. Under 
‘sequence’ is understood the relation between two or more events, and 
‘duration’ refers to the time during which an event takes place or the elapsed 
time between two events. Since time can be regarded as a personal 
construction, this view leads to the development of a variety of ways to 
measure a person’s ability to perceive time. Some of these include time 
estimation, whereby a person observes stimulus duration and then estimates 
the duration of that stimulus. In the case of time production subjects are 
instructed to produce a certain time duration and in time reproduction
 
 the 
subjects are instructed to reproduce a prior given stimulus of the same 
duration that has been experienced previously (Nelson, 1996). It has been 
established in psychological research that the judgement of specific duration 
often varies from person to person. Factors influencing these variations are 
personality, amount of light, age, gender, cognitive ability, learning, culture 
and drug intake as well as mental or neurological disorders (Eisler, 1993; 
Friedman, 1990). 
 
2.3.1 Influence of mental and neurological disorders 
 
 
Davids and Falkoff (1975) suggest that the sense of time evolved as an ego 
function. The sense of time enables the integration of temporal perspectives 
and attention to the present moment and provides the individual with the 
power to delay gratification. Furthermore, the accurate assessment of the 
passage of time makes it possible to tolerate the delay of reward. It can 
therefore be concluded that a systematic relationship between time 
perception and delayed gratification provides an individual with the ability to 
assess the passage of time accurately. To estimate the right duration one 
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must wait in order to attain gratification, and therefore the ability to control 
impulsive actions is a basic function of people’s time sense. 
 
Barrett and Patton (1983) maintain that there is a relationship between 
impulsivity and time estimation, based on the assumption that impulsive 
individuals have difficulty with delayed gratification. They argue that such 
individuals usually exhibit a tendency to respond quickly to a given stimulus 
without evaluating the consequences of their actions. The researchers also 
postulate that a faster cognitive tempo is related to impulsivity and that the 
internal clock of an impulsive individual is therefore faster than that of 
 
a non 
impulsive individual. However, Lennings and Burns (1998) tested the 
hypotheses regarding the influence of impulsivity on time estimation but 
were unable to establish a significant correlation between the variables 
‘impulsivity’ and ‘inaccuracies in time estimation’. 
Cappella, Gentile and Juliano (1977) tested the assumption that children with 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) seem to have an internal 
clock that runs faster than that of healthy children. In their experimental set-
up, the experimenter dropped a ball to start a time interval, and the children 
were then instructed to drop another ball when they thought that a given 
time interval had passed. They found that the hyperactive children sensed a 
larger difference between the estimated time and the actual elapsed time 
than the control group and always underestimated the pre-established time 
period. The difference in time estimation between children with ADHD and 
normal subjects increased with the length of the estimated duration, 
suggesting that children with ADHD had more difficulty in delaying their need 
for gratification over a longer time period.  
 
A study conducted by Berlin and Rolls (2004) focused on people with 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) with regard to time perception, 
impulsivity and personality types. The test subjects had to complete a time 
20 
 
perception task, a matching familiar figures test and a spatial working 
memory task. They found that BPD patients produced shorter time spans 
across all time intervals (10, 30, 60 and 90 s) than normal controls. The 
underestimation of durations became more apparent as time intervals 
increased. The results indicate that BPD patients possibly have a faster 
cognitive pace and therefore feel that the set time interval has passed earlier 
than normal subjects. The findings can also be attributed to increased 
frustration levels when waiting for the time interval to end. The results of the 
study suggests that there may be a slight tendency for BPD patients to 
overestimate shorter times more than the normal control group, but that 
BPD patients do not experience any significant difficulties with the 
completion of tasks involving spatial working memory. 
 
 
2.3.2 Influence of affective factors 
 
 
Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese and Manfredini (1997) tested the influence of 
stimulus-induced emotional arousal and affective valence on time estimation 
with the help of standardised photographic slides. Two groups of subjects 
had to estimate durations of 2, 4 and 6 s. The first group used an analogue 
scale and the second group reproduced the interval by pushing a button. The 
estimated time, skin conductance response and heart rate were recorded. 
The results showed that negative slides with low-arousal stimuli were judged 
shorter than positive low- arousal slides, and the duration of high-arousal 
negative slides was judged longer than that of high-arousal positive slides. 
These results suggest the existence of a one-time estimation system that 
gets activated under low-arousal conditions and another time estimation 
system that gets activated in high-arousal situations. The findings are in 
accordance with the theory proposed by LeDoux (1995), which is based on 
the concept that one subcortical and one cortical neural pathway are 
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responsible for the processing of emotional stimuli. Highly activating and 
potentially dangerous stimuli are processed by the subcortical pathway but it 
only receives incomplete information. The cortical pathway receives more 
precise information but is therefore slower and is able to inhibit faulty 
responses elicited by the subcortical pathway. 
 
Another factor that can influence duration estimation is the so-called 
‘watched pot’ phenomenon where the duration experience is lengthened 
when one is attentively or impatiently waiting for some event to occur. 
Factors responsible for this phenomenon are inter alia the fact that waiting is 
a basic, affective condition that simulates the feeling of time (Fraisse, 1963). 
Ornstein (1969) further proposes that waiting increases vigilance, resulting 
in a higher awareness of input. Finally, Block (1979) posits that attention to 
time and duration depends on cognitive factors and showed that it is 
subjectively experienced as longer in a ‘prospective paradigm’ than in a 
‘retrospective paradigm’. In a prospective paradigm subjects are instructed 
before a experiment is conducted that they will have to report specific details 
about an event, whereas they are only given vague instructions and then 
questioned afterwards about an event in the retrospective paradigm.   
 
To test his hypothesis Block (1979) conducted three experiments in which 
the test subjects had to observe a liquid-containing beaker on an electrical 
burner for 270 s. Observers in the prospective paradigm were told that the 
experiment concerned time perception. In the retrospective paradigm they 
were informed that it is about visual perception. Two types of trial were 
conducted; in the one the liquid started boiling and in the other the liquid 
never reached the boiling point. The trials were conducted once with 
interruptive questioning and then without questioning. The study indicated 
that the prospective paradigm led to a greater duration overestimation in the 
temporal reproduction task, which was even higher when the liquid did not 
boil. When the observers were interrupted by task-unrelated questioning it 
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led to a shortened reproduction if the liquid did not boil. In the retrospective 
paradigm a boiling liquid or questioning alone led to a duration 
overestimation. The overestimation did not increase significantly when both 
boiling and questioning were present (Block, George & Reed, 1980). 
 
 
2.3.3 Influence of age 
 
 
A further factor that has to be addressed in connection with temporal 
perception is age, and there have been indications that a slowing of clock 
speed occurs with ageing. A slowing down of the internal clock would 
influence overall time perception and influence the ability to estimate 
durations correctly. Using a reproduction time-estimation method in which a 
person had to delimit a subsequent duration to be subjectively equal to a 
previously experienced one, Vanneste and Pouthas (1995) found that at 
around the age of 65 the mean duration judgement ratio was approximately 
60-70% compared to the age of 20. They concluded that the adult age-
related change in retrospective duration judgements resembles that noted 
for the overall information-processing rates. After age 20, both information-
processing rates and retrospective duration judgements decrease. It is 
therefore questionable whether the differences in time estimation between 
the young and the elderly should be attributed to a slowing of an internal 
clock or whether they are due to a decline in information-processing rates 
and memory performance.  
 
Wearden, Wearden and Rabbitt (1997) investigated possible age-related 
changes in timing behaviour with subjects aged from 60 to 80 years. They 
employed a temporal generalisation as well as other timing tasks. The 
subjects were split into two age groups (60-69 and 70-79) with average IQ 
equated or three IQ groups (lowest, middle and highest third) with age 
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equated to safeguard against the age-related decline in IQ (Wearden, 1997). 
The results indicated that the temporal generalisation gradients were 
influenced by age because the older group produced slightly flatter gradients, 
suggesting more errors in identifying the comparison durations. The three IQ 
groups showed significant differences and the temporal generalisation 
gradients varied among the groups, with the lowest-IQ third being much 
flatter than the one of the highest-IQ third. The steepness of the 
generalisation gradients indicates the precision of timing whereby a steeper 
gradient represents a more precise timing performance. The results of the 
study therefore suggest that there is a slight decrease in timing precision 
with increasing age and significant decrease in precision with decreasing IQ. 
 
 
2.3.4 Influence of stress and drugs 
 
 
Another aspect that has to be considered is the influence of affective factors 
on time perception. Not only do attention and amount of information 
processed influence time estimation but arousal and affective valence also 
have an effect. People who undergo extreme short-term psychological stress 
often claim that time slowed down for them during this experience. 
Traumatic events such as car accidents or lengthy falls often appear to take 
place in slow motion, and scientists suspect that slowed time perception is an 
evolved defence mechanism that is part of people’s fight-or-flight response 
(Hancock & Warm, 1989; Stokes & Kite, 1994). The slowing down of time 
provides us with more subjective time in which to deal with a crisis situation, 
and extreme stress helps them to think faster. According to the contextual 
theory stress drains attentional resources and reduces the allocation of the 
needed resources. This leads to an assignment of the remaining resources to 
task-relevant activities, and the attention to time-based cues is highly 
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reduced. This results in a distortion of temporal perception for time-in-
passing and for time recollection in memory (Hancock & Weaver, 2005).  
 
The time distortions experienced during a high-threat situation have been 
researched by Fair (1984). He interviewed 28 subjects who had ejected from 
a jet aircraft and were put in a high-stress situation since they had to decide 
on the right time to leave the aircraft and cope with the dangers in the 
ejection procedure itself. An apparent slowing of time was reported by 64% 
of the subjects; 18% reported a speeding up of time. In both cases the flow 
rate of the external environment was reported to have changed significantly. 
The results indicate that time distortions under stress lead to two different 
forms of experience. In the first form events seem to be stuck into a 
temporal ‘blur’ and time seems to have speeded up. In the second form time 
appears to slow down and events can be recalled with great clarity.  
 
The phenomenon of these opposite directions in time distortion can be 
explained with the help of the accumulation model according to which the 
individual creates his or her own time perception by filling moments in time 
with a sequence of experiences (Roeckelein, 2000). The perceived slowing of 
time is an adaptive response to the stress situation and provides the 
individual with more time to deal with a threatening situation and also 
provides an increased event registration for accurate recall of the event. 
Time slows in proportion to the increase in event registration and the clarity 
of recall and number of events cannot be reconciled with normal time 
translation and therefore time seems to slow down.   
 
The apparent speeding up of time can be explained by the re-direction of 
attention towards ‘internal’ events and the flight response so that only a few 
external events are registered within a perceptual moment. The decrease in 
event registration leads to a perceived speeding up of time. It is further 
assumed that response stereotypes are enhanced during stressful situations. 
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This leads to a higher number of ‘flight’ responses among introverts while 
extroverts more frequently choose ‘fight’ responses. Under normal and 
medium levels of stress the time distortion seems to be only unidirectional 
leading to a perceived speeding up of time (Hancock & Weaver, 2005). The 
way in which stress reduces attentional capabilities can be compared to the 
effect that is found during attentional ‘narrowing’. With regard to visio-spatial 
cues, the effect of ‘tunnel vision’ has been reported by pilots when exposed 
to high-G loading. It can be concluded that stress affects both vision and 
time in a similar systematic way since the strategy of narrowing the 
perceptual field is an effective way to deal with the lack of attentional 
resources (Dirkin & Hancock, 1984).  
 
Drugs can also influence the subjective experience of time. With the use of 
animal subjects, Meck (1996) investigated the effect of drugs that stimulated 
the dopamine system of the brain with regard to their impact on the 
pacemaker of the internal clock. His findings indicated that elevated 
dopamine levels speed up the internal clock and that reduced dopamine 
levels slow the clock down. The rats in his experiment remembered the time 
at which food was delivered as being shorter or longer than it really was, and 
it can therefore be concluded that cholinergic drugs influenced temporal 
memory processes systematically to a greater degree than clock processes. 
Evidence that the internal clock exists as a real physical mechanism is 
provided by experiments involving pharmacological manipulations or physical 
manipulations such as the change in body temperature. The pharmacological 
separation of clock and memory processes further suggested
 
 that they are 
not just different parts of a psychological model but that they are also based 
on separate cognitive mechanisms.  
A significant amount of research has analysed the impact of stressors on the 
functioning of cortical catecholamine (CA) neurotransmission and has 
generally indicated that the synthesis and utilisation of adrenergic and 
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dopaminergic systems were altered (Anisman & Zacharko, 1990). The 
degree of CA alteration was found to be dependent on the nature of the 
stressors employed. After the application of tail-pinch as mild stressors in 
rats, an alteration of the releases of dopamine (DA) and noradrenalin 
indicated a different distribution across the striatum, the nucleus accumbens 
and the medial prefrontal cortex, which are part of the mesotelencephalic DA 
systems. The peripheral administration of d-amphetamine also results in the 
activation of parts of the mesotelencephalic DA systems by altering the 
extracellular concentrations of DA in the striatum and the nucleus accumbens 
significantly.  
 
Chang, Liao, Lan and Shen (2000) tested the effects of stress on the timing 
behaviour of rats with the aid of lever-press experiments. The method of tail-
pinching with a sponge-padded paper clip was used as stressor and was 
applied for 10 minutes, 1 hour before the commencement of each test 
session. In the study three different set-ups were used. The first design 
included a differential reinforcement of low rates of 10 s (DRL10). To obtain 
a reward, the rats had to estimate correctly when 10 s had elapsed since the 
previous press. Each lever press prior to the 10-s period resulted in a reset 
of the delay timer. In the second set-up a fixed-interval of 60 s (FI60) was 
employed and the first lever press given 60 s after the preceding reinforcer 
was rewarded. Any lever presses made during each 60 s interval did not 
reset the timer. In the fixed-ratio of 20 accumulated 20 lever presses.  
 
The loss of behavioural inhibition due to the exposure to the stressors had 
little effect on the performance of the subjects under FI60 and FR20. The 
artificially induced stress significantly altered the DRL10 behaviour. Following 
a tail-pinch the number of early lever presses increased, indicating that the 
stressed rat was unable to estimate the time interval. One explanation for 
this alteration would be that DRL behaviour requires a more precise cognitive 
representation of the time interval. Early lever presses result in the resetting 
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of the timer and give no reward. The reward acts as a periodic 
reinforcement, which is always present under F160. DRL10 lacks this 
constant reinforcement, making it even more difficult to reproduce the 
correct duration. When the subject had been given a d-amphetamine 
treatment (0.2 and 2.0 mg/kg) after application of the stressors, its 
performance under DRL10 equalled non-pinch trials.           
 
This indicates that CA systems are involved in the modulation of DRL10 
behaviour following a stressor in the form of a tail-pinch. Another effect of 
the applied stressors was that the normal bimodal distribution of inter-
response times (IRT) frequencies was significantly shifted to the left under 
DRL10. The median IRTs of 5.1-7.5 s increased significantly and long IRTs of 
10 s or greater decreased. The study has shown that tail-pinch manipulation 
and amphetamine administration produced quantitatively the same effects 
on response and reinforcement frequency during a differential reinforcement 
of low rates (DRL) test (Chang et. al., 2000). 
 
 
2.4 LAWS AND MODELS OF TEMPORAL PROCESSING 
 
 
The underlying mechanisms allowing people to possess a sense of time are 
not yet fully understood. Precise timing is only relevant for shorter intervals 
that are needed in order to perform activities such as music, dance, sport, 
vehicle driving and communication. It is not yet clear whether a single timing 
mechanism handles time perception for both short and long durations, since 
long durations do not have to be estimated with the same accuracy as short 
duration activities, and could be processed by a different mechanism 
(Madison & Merker, 2000). The fact that more than one mechanism could be 
responsible for human time perception can explain why it has been so 
difficult to find a single model that can explain how altered perceptions of 
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time occurs, and that can estimate the length of temporal activities and 
durations correctly.  
 
 
2.4.1 Basic laws in chronometric research  
 
2.4.1.1 Weber’s law applied to temporal perception 
 
The two basic laws in chronometric research are Weber’s law, which has 
been widely applied to temporal perception, and Vierordt’s law, which is 
relevant to the process of duration estimation. Weber’s law was put forth by 
Weber (1846), who is famous for his research into aural and cutaneous 
sensations and whose work can be regarded as the foundation for a branch 
of scientific investigation that has come to be known as psychophysics. With 
the application of psychophysics, definite measurements regarding the 
relation of physical stimuli to the resulting psychical or mental facts were 
developed. These measures provided the basis for the field of experimental 
psychology. Weber’s law is now frequently used in studies of time perception 
and has been the foundation for several theories of timing. It introduced the 
idea that the increase of stimulus necessary to produce an increase of 
sensation in any sensory modality is not a fixed quantity. The necessary 
alteration required for a given stimulus will be proportional to the change in 
the immediately preceding stimulus.  
 
Weber’s law basically states that the difference between the intensities of 
two stimuli can be so low that the distinction is barely noticeable. This 
sensation, also called ‘just noticeable difference’ (JND), is according to Weber 
proportional to the physical intensity of the stimuli. The Weber fraction is 
useful for measuring and comparing discriminability across different 
modalities and stimulus ranges (Boring, Langfeld & Weld, 1935; Eisler, 
1993).The relative accuracy may be measured as the amount of change in a 
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stimulus necessary for it to be detected some proportion of the time, divided 
by the magnitude of the stimulus on which that is superimposed, _S/S, 
where _S is the amount of stimulus change necessary to exceed threshold,1 
and S is the magnitude of the stimulus on which it is superimposed. Weber’s 
law asserts that this ratio is constant over variation in S (Allan & 
Kristofferson, 1974; Gibbon, 1977; Killeen & Weiss, 1987). The coefficient of 
variation (cv), provides an alternate measure of relative variability and is 
proportional to the Weber fraction. For the time domain the formula  
 
cv = 
t
σ                                    (1) 
is used where σ is the standard deviation of the temporal estimates or 
productions and t is the mean of those times. The application of Weber’s law 
has been shown to be valid for interval estimation of durations from 0.2 to 2 
s (Grondin, 2001). Research findings invalidating the applicability of Weber’s 
indicated that the standard deviations of time estimates for well-trained 
subjects became invariant over substantial ranges. Furthermore, the law 
does not generally hold for durations less than 0.25 s (Allan & Kristofferson, 
1974; Fetterman & Killeen, 1992). Weber’s law has been generalised by 
Getty (1975). He divided the variability of temporal discrimination into one 
dependent and one independent component relating to the magnitude of the 
stimulus. The sum of these two components is the total variance.  
 
σ
T
2  = σ
t
2  + σ 
r
2                                                                                (2)                                                      
Here the total variance is σ
T
2  and the variance that covaries with the 
magnitude of the stimulus is σ
t
2  and the constant residual variance is σ
r
2  . 
σ
t
2 = w 2 t 2                                
then 
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σ
T
2  = w 2 t 2 + σ
r
2     
and   
σ
T
= w 2 t 2 + σ
r
2                                                                                (3)                                                                                                                                                                                 
In eq (1) σ is the standard deviation of the temporal estimates and is divided 
by t. 
To provide a Weber fraction the derived formula is also divided by time. 
 
σ
T
           σ
r
2  
 t   =     w 2 +  t 2              , t > 0                                                    (4)                                       
In a case where σ
r
 is smaller than wt the third equation is reduced to a 
more or less linear relation between the values of σ
T
 and t, where w stands 
for the slope and σ
r
 for the intercept. In eq (4) the Weber fraction becomes 
an asymptote of w as t increases. This version of Weber’s law was able to 
account for the performance on duration discriminations less than 2 s but 
was not valid for longer time periods. A subsequent generalisation by Killeen 
and Weiss (1987) assumed that timing errors arise from either the 
pacemaker or the counter and that accuracy is improved by dividing a long 
interval into subcomponents that are produced by the pacemaker. The 
counter counts the intervals and their sum is t = nd. The duration estimated 
is t, the average number of components is n and the average component 
duration is d. The random sum of random variables constitutes the total 
timing variance σ
T
2  that is the weighted sum of the pacemaker variance, σ
D
2  
and a counter variance of σ
N
2 . 
σ
T
2 = n σ
D
2 + d 2  σ
D
2                     (5) 
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In a further development of the formula, the variances in pacemaker and 
counter are quadratic functions of their means.  
σ
D
2 = a
2
 d 2 + a
1
d + a
0
                                (6)                                 
 σ
N
2 = β 
2
n 2 + β 
1
n + β 
0
                                (7) 
Killeen and Weiss (1987) further minimised the overall timing variance σ by 
selecting the best values of n and d. This was achieved by estimating 
intervals close to 0.  
σ
T
2  = (AT) 2  + Bt + C                    (8)        
The parameters A, B and C are concatenations of the parameters of eqs (6) 
and (7). Because A = β2, asymptotically the Weber fraction equals the 
Weber fraction for the counter alone.  Expressed in terms of standard 
deviations, (8) becomes: 
 
σ
T
= (AT) 2  + Bt + C                            (9)                     
In order to provide a Weber fraction the formula can be divided by time 
 
σ
T
   (AT) 2 + Bt + C        
   t   =          t                                   (10) 
 
Killeen and Weiss’s model was tested and evaluated by Ivry and Hazeltine 
(1995). They came to the conclusion that eq (8) provided the best 
description of temporal variance, and that the function was easily portrayed 
by outlining the target interval in units squared, which resulted in a fairly 
accurate straight line. It remains questionable where and how the Weber 
variance can be introduced in the commonly used models. For the majority 
of clock counter models, all β coefficients and α1 in eqs (6) and (7) are 
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implicitly 0. This problem aspect led to the reintroduction of the Weber error 
in subsequent theories and models, including the scalar timing model (SET). 
 
The most often cited theory of timing is Gibbon’s (1977) SET, which is based 
entirely on Weber’s law. The validity of the SET has been undermined by the 
demonstrations of a systematic departure from Weber’s law that have been 
reported for temporal perception (Crystal, 2001) and also for other types of 
stimuli. These have been termed “the near miss to Weber’s law” and “the 
severe departure from Weber’s law” (Gallego & Micheyl, 1998; Oxenham & 
Moore, 1995). A study conducted by Bizo (2006) and his colleagues aimed at 
providing evidence for the Weber’s law by using a temporal production and a 
categorisation experiments. They employed a production task which required 
pigeons to switch between keys within a specified temporal window. The 
categorisation task required them to classify stimulus duration as either 
short or long. The results showed a severe departure from the values 
predicted under Weber’s law. The resulting fractions did not descend to a 
horizontal asymptote, but resulted in a U-shaped curve that decreased as a 
function of the target duration and increased again at intermediate and long 
durations.  
 
A subsequent generalisation of Killeen and Weiss’s interpretation of Weber’s 
law was conducted by Killeen and Taylor (2000). They employed the theory 
of stochastic counters (TSC), which provides the architecture for counters 
that conform to Weber’s law in the large but deviate from it locally so that it 
allows an increase in the timing error that can be caused by failures of the 
count register because it was kept at a random setting between zero and its 
last count. The TSC permits deviations from Weber’s law in which the Weber 
fraction can increase by as much as the 3/2 power of the interval timed. 
Further possible explanations are random responding and a slowing of the 
pacemaker itself. 
 
33 
 
2.4.1.2 Duration estimation and Vierordt’s law 
 
In the same time period Karl Vierordt studied temporal integration with the 
help of stimulus reproduction and further conducted time estimation 
experiments, which led to the development of Vierordt’s law. Vierordt’s law 
predicts that human test subjects will overestimate short durations and 
underestimate long durations with some difference point between the two 
values (Wearden, 2003). The existence of an indifference point at which the 
estimated time is closest to being equal to the pre-established duration was 
of great interest to classical time psychologists and they attributed profound 
psychological significance to this phenomenon (Fraisse, 1963).    
 
During a temporal reproduction task the subject is first exposed to a stimulus 
for the sample duration, ‘s’. The subject then has to reproduce the pre-given 
duration and indicate the end of the duration ‘r’, with the help of a motor 
response. The method can also be described as ‘reproduction by waiting’ and 
involves just a single motor response. Data from reproduction experiments 
have shown that r and s often differ and that r > s when s is small and closer 
to it when s is longer. One essential point to consider is that the measured 
reproduction, r, is generated by two consecutive processes. First, subjects 
wait until the elapsed time is ‘close enough’ to s before initiating a response. 
Second, making the response itself requires the time, d. The total 
reproduction, r, is made up of the time of response initiation (t) plus d (Wing 
& Kristofferson, 1973). 
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2.4.2 Basic models of temporal processing 
 
2.4.2.1 Clock- and memory-based models of temporal processing 
 
Numerous models concerning the workings of an internal timer have been 
proposed, which also try to provide an explanation for the effects of rising 
cognitive demands on the estimation of time. One such model consisting of 
an internal clock that emits pulses by several independent stochastic sources 
that are accumulated in an internal counter was proposed by Creelman 
(1962). Treisman (1963) had a different vision regarding the inner workings 
of the clock model. She assumed that a single pacemaker emits a regular 
series of pulses that increases with the subject’s arousal level. Other 
researchers reject and favour the storage hypothesis.  
 
Ornstein (1969) was the first theorist to move away from a chronometric 
mechanism and introduced the idea of a storage model. His theory maintains 
that remembered durations depend on the amount of information taken up 
by encoded and retrievable stimuli. The experience of a lengthened duration 
is according to Ornstein caused by a high number of stimuli or by complex 
encoded stimuli. Attentional models provide a neuronal explanation for the 
phenomenon of dual-task interference. Thomas, Brown and Weaver (1974; 
1975) were interested in the question how allocating attention influences the 
perception of duration. In their model the judged duration of an interval is 
monotonically related to the weighted average of the amount encoded by 
two parallel processors. They came to the conclusion that when more 
attention is allocated to the non temporal information processor the timer 
becomes less reliable (Thomas & Brown, 1974; Thomas & Weaver, 1975). 
 
It has further been proposed by Macar that time bases rely on specific 
neuronal interactions. One type of neurons responsible for feature detection 
fires in response to specific configurations of parameters in various 
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modalities. Another type the ‘periodic neurons’ is time conditioned to one of 
the several periodic activities of the organism and provides it with an internal 
timing mechanism independent of external stimulation. The third type of 
neuron focus on modality and evaluate the physical characteristics of the 
stimulus. These neurons are responsible for the effects of temporal 
information on subjective time. The different firing patterns of the three 
types of neuron result in the construction of the subjective time experience 
(Macar, 1985). 
 
2.4.2.2 The scalar timing model (SET) 
 
The SET by Allan and Gibbon (1991) merges timing models based on clock 
and memory processes. Despite the lack of evidence for a brain mechanism 
working with a pacemaker-accumulator clock they nevertheless propose an 
internal clock model consisting of a pacemaker, switch, accumulator, working 
memory, reference memory and comparator. The pacemaker produces 
pulses or ‘ticks’ that are collected in the accumulator. For the timing of a 
stimulus, the switch closes and the pulses flow from the pacemaker into the 
accumulator, and when the stimulus ends the switch opens again and cuts 
the connection between them. The number of accumulated pulses is stored 
in the working memory. Important times, such as the standard time needed 
for a particular task, are stored in reference memory, and the number of 
pulses in working and reference memory is then compared inside the 
comparator to make temporal judgements. It is further assumed that the 
rate of the pacemaker is variable and proportional to the rate of 
reinforcement. Most theoretical analyses using the SET have regarded the 
reference memory as the source of scalar variance that arises during the 
transformation of time representations from working memory to reference 
memory (Meck, 1996).  
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According to Wearden’s (1992) model of temporal generalisation, during 
each trial the just-presented stimulus duration, t, timed without variance, is 
compared with a sample, s*, drawn from the standard, s, which has been 
stored in reference memory. The reference memory of s is assumed to be a 
Gaussian distribution with mean s and coefficient of variation, c, which is 
constant as s varies in absolute value between conditions. The model judges 
that t is ‘close enough’ to s when |(s*–t)|/t < b*. The threshold, b*, can be 
variable from trial to trial or assumed to be fixed without substantial loss of 
predictive accuracy. In subsequent studies, Wearden changed his initial 
assumption that reference is the source of errors in time estimation and 
started to investigate the possible influence of the other parts of the SET.  
 
Inaccuracies in time estimation are therefore assumed to be produced by the 
internal clock itself. Other possible sources of temporal variance are errors 
within the pacemaker, the counting of pulses or the switch mechanism. One 
hypothesis concerning the switch that controls the start and end of timing is 
that it does not operate instantaneously with the physical onset and offset of 
the timed stimulus. This discrepancy between external stimulus and internal 
timer is assumed to occur with zero variance from trial to trial, and the 
switching processes must be taken into consideration as a potentially 
important source of variance in cross-modal timing (Wearden & Culpin, 
1998).  
 
Wearden and Bray (2001) further investigated the clock as the source of 
timing inaccuracies by conducting three experiments, testing whether the 
scalar property of timing could occur when humans timed short durations 
under a condition that made it highly improbable that the subjects could 
have developed reference memories of temporal standard intervals. In their 
first experiment they used an episodic version of a temporal generalisation 
task and judgements on the potential equality of two durations presented on 
each trial had to be made. The durations of 200, 400, 600 or 800 ms and 
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variable duration were presented to the subjects. The temporal 
generalisation gradients indicated the scalar property of superimposition at 
standard values greater than 200 ms. In the second experiment a variation 
of the ‘roving bisection’ method invented by Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik 
(1998) was used. It had been adapted in such a way that the scalar property 
of timing could be observed empirically.  
 
The experimental data revealed almost perfect scalar-type superimposition 
bisection with short/long standard pairs of 100/400, 200/800 and 300/1200 
ms. In the third experiment an episodic temporal generalisation was 
employed again, but in this experimental set-up the durations were not 
repeated and came from three distinct time ranges. The resulting data 
indicated a superimposition of all ranges except for the shortest visual stimuli 
timed. The results of the three experiments led to the conclusion that scalar 
timing can also be possible under conditions where the formation of 
reference memories with regard to the creation of temporal standards must 
be regarded as very unlikely.   
 
 
2.5 INFLUENCE OF MULTIPLE-TASKS ON ATTENTION, TIME ESTIMATION 
AND MEMORY 
 
 
2.5.1 Basic concepts of attention 
 
 
Perception is the process through which a person is exposed to information. 
The input from the external environment is received through the person’s 
senses and he or she attends to the information by allocating processing 
capacity. Through the process of interpretation the information obtains 
meaning and is comprehended. In order to receive information from the 
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external environment cognitive capacity has to be allocated to an object or 
task. A distinction can be drawn between three types of attention. The first is 
voluntary attention whereby a person actively searches out information that 
has personal relevance. The second is selective attention whereby a person 
selectively focuses attention on relevant information. The last is involuntary 
attention whereby a person is exposed to something surprising, novel, 
threatening or unexpected.  
 
The received information is comprehended through the use of interpretation 
processes, and people draw upon their experience, memory and expectations 
to attach meaning to a stimulus. Expectations include prior beliefs about 
what should be happening in a given situation, and they can influence the 
interpretation of information. The level of involvement is influenced by the 
process through which a person is influenced by the perceived personal 
importance and/or interest evoked by a stimulus. Personal importance 
increases as perceived risk increases. As involvement increases, a person 
has greater motivation to comprehend and elaborate on information, and 
higher levels of involvement are expected to result in a greater depth of 
information processing, increased arousal and more extended decision 
making (Styles, 1997). 
 
Certain tasks take time to complete and require sustained attention. One of 
the first people to study sustained attention was Mackworth (1950) who 
discovered that if a person was asked to concentrate on a tedious task his or 
her performance deteriorated over time. This deterioration is termed 
performance decrement and researchers were interested in examining ways 
in which tasks could be designed to minimise this effect. In an experiment 
using visual stimulation it has been found that light signals that were 
brighter or longer led to a reduction in performance decrement. It was 
further established that stimulants such as amphetamines can counter 
performance decrement. The provision of feedback has been shown to be 
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useful and introverts have proven to be less susceptible than extroverts. 
External factors such as a moderate disturbance and the presence of other 
people can help reduce performance decrement.  
 
Selective attention is the ability to attend to one stimulus rather than 
another and implies that people can consciously focus on one stimulus but do 
so usually at the expense of another. One of the first key studies in the 
investigation of selective attention was that carried out by Colin Cherry 
(1953). He investigated the cocktail party problem to see how people can 
carry on a conversation and focus their attention on one person, amongst all 
the noise and distractions found at a party. To study the phenomenon of 
‘focused auditory attention’ Cherry employed the dichotic listening task. 
During this kind of experiment subjects had to wear special headphones in 
which two different messages were presented to each ear and they had to 
concentrate on just one of the messages. Later they were asked to repeat 
the content of both messages. It was found that the listeners obtained very 
little information from the unattended ear (Wood & Cowan, 1995). However, 
physical changes in the unattended message were noticed, for example 
whether speech was replaced by a pure tone, whether the sex of the speaker 
changed or if the loudness changed. 
 
 
2.5.2 Theories of attention and resource allocation 
 
 
Based on the fact that humans only have enough resources to effectively 
attend to one channel at a time, they need some mechanism to limit the 
information that they take in. The British psychologist Donald Broadbent 
(1958) put forward the first detailed theory of attention. His filter theory was 
based on findings from shadowing and dichotic listening tasks. Broadbent’s 
key assumptions included the theory that two stimuli or messages presented 
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at the same time gain access in parallel to a sensory buffer that holds 
information for a short period before it either attends to or deletes the 
information from the processing system. If an input is allowed to pass 
through a filter on the basis of its physical characteristics, it is stored with 
other input in the buffer for later processing. The filter can be directed by 
top-down or bottom-up influences. Top-down influences include a person's 
own intentions and expectations. Bottom-up influences, in contrast, are 
directed by stimuli in the world that ‘catch’ people’s attention (Broadbent, 
1958).  
 
The cocktail party effect is a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
influences on attention. Taking the environment of a cocktail party as 
example where numerous conversations are going on at once, one sees that 
it is possible to tune out other voices and pay attention only to the ones that 
are of interest and they are then assigned to the primary input channel 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1996). If another conversation includes 
a certain cue word of personal importance the attention is diverted and the 
primary focus is given to this conversation. This effect is bottom-up in that it 
is driven by a stimulus in the environment. However, it also depends on top-
down influences in that it hinges on what is important or familiar to a certain 
person. Stimuli are more likely to draw attention if they have been previously 
primed by recent or frequent thought. The function of the filter is to prevent 
overloading of the limited-capacity mechanism beyond the filter where the 
filtered information input is processed thoroughly and given meaning by 
higher centres in the brain. 
 
The sensory store in the channel theory explains people’s ability to follow 
numerous inputs from similar sources. It is common to pay attention to more 
than one channel at a time and this is not problematic if the stimuli are 
different enough since this leads to less interference. However, in cases 
where the stimuli are similar or people have to listen to more than one 
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conversation at the same time by, for example, rapidly switching between 
the two channels in the sensory store where visual or audio information is 
stored. In this model, STM information is stored for a period of a few seconds 
regardless of whether it was attended to or not. After switching back to one 
channel, information is retrieved from the sensory store; but due to the 
switching process, some information from each channel may be lost. 
 
To deal with this anomaly Triesman (1964) developed the attenuation 
theory, which posits that in a first filter the information is reduced in strength 
or attenuated rather than filtered out according to some physical 
characteristics. A second-stage filter processes the information semantically 
to extract meaning, and if found to be significant the information is 
strengthened and made conscious. Triesman proposed that information 
would have different thresholds of response for each individual, depending 
on the personal significance and meaning of the information. She also 
regarded other characteristics such as the noise level as important. Other 
researchers such as Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) and later Norman (1976) 
regarded the two-stage model of Triesman's attenuation theory as 
unnecessarily complex. They proposed a ‘late selection model’ according to 
which all information is filtered semantically regardless of physical 
characteristics, to determine whether the information should be attended to 
or ignored. According to this model, the selection of stimuli for final 
processing is delayed until the information has been analysed for meaning. 
 
Kahneman (1973) proposed a theory based on the assumption that the 
attentional system has a limited capacity and can only process a certain 
amount of input at any one time and is not limited because it has to pass 
through filters. Norman and Bobrow (1975) have suggested that the reason 
for such limitations in attention is because the available information is simply 
inadequate for the task at hand. In other situations the data may not 
inadequate, but the ability to process that data is impaired. According to 
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these models, there is therefore an upper limit to the amount of information 
that can be attended to satisfactorily. The limited capacity models of 
attention have been criticised by Spelke, Hirst and Neisser (1976).Their 
studies have shown that attentional ability can be extended with practice. In 
their experiments they asked students to read stories and at the same time 
to listen to and write down a list of words.  After six weeks of practice the 
subjects had no difficulty in performing these tasks simultaneously. 
Subsequent studies on divided attention studies conducted by Allport, 
Antonis and Reynolds (1972) indicated that instead of just a single general 
purpose attentional mechanism, there may be several different mechanisms 
that are used depending on the information to be processed. 
 
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) suggest that people are able to perform 
multiple tasks because one of them has been practised to the extent that it 
has become automatic and therefore largely unconscious. One example of 
this is driving, which at first requires a great deal of concentration to master 
all the skills involved, but then with practice becomes automatic and 
unconscious. This allows the driver to do other things while driving, such as 
holding a conversation or tuning the radio. Gopher (1993) also found that 
practice can improve people’s ability to divide their attention. He found that 
trainee pilots who practised dividing their attention by using a computer 
game called Space Fortress were twice as likely as other trainees to become 
qualified pilots. 
 
2.5.2.1 Task-switching costs 
 
Multitasking takes place when two or more tasks are performed 
simultaneously requiring a person to switch from one task to another, or to 
perform the tasks in rapid succession. The process is generally efficient in 
terms of time and resources, but could lead to inaccuracy, and if complex 
tasks are involved it could even have a negative influence on productivity. 
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Moreover, multitasking can become problematic when the cost of switching 
between tasks conflicts with environmental demands for productivity and 
safety. This type of negative effect can occur even when switching costs are 
relatively small, involving no more than a few tenths of a second per switch. 
The problem is that these small amounts can add up, and shifting between 
tasks may lead to the creation of brief mental blocks so that as much as 
40% of a person’s productive work time can become compromised 
(Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans, 2001). Research on multitasking seem to 
suggest that despite its parallel processing capabilities, the brain has not 
been designed to always perform multiple tasks simultaneously in an optimal 
manner.  
 
The extent to which the switching between two tasks is controlled 
consciously has been evaluated by Meiran, Hommel, Bibi and Lev (2002). 
Subjects had to indicate their readiness for a task switch, and the time 
needed to achieve readiness for the task switch and the target reaction times 
were of interest in this experiment. It was assumed that a long task 
preparation time would lead to a faster target reaction time, but the opposite 
effect occurred. The results of the study indicated that a long task 
preparation time led to a significant lengthening of the target reaction time. 
The results further showed that the subjects lacked conscious awareness 
concerning their preparedness to switch between the two tasks. The results 
reported by Meiran et al. therefore contradict the broad consensus that 
higher-level control operations such as task set selection, ordering and 
chaining lower-level task execution processes are consciously controlled 
(Meiran et al., 2002).  
 
A similar study Rogers and Monsell (1995) reinforced this interpretation, 
indicating that the switching costs between tasks can be split up into two 
parts. The first component relates to the time and resources needed to 
adjust the mental control settings. If sufficient time is provided subjects can 
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prepare for this adjustment so that it appears to be amenable to conscious 
control. The second part of the switching costs is immune to preparation and 
pertains to the competition over resources and a ‘carry-over’ effect of the 
control settings from a previous experimental trial.  
 
Rubinstein, Meyer and Evans (2001) provide evidence for a noteworthy 
increase in task-switching costs among more complex tasks. Time costs were 
also greater when the subjects switched to an unfamiliar task and less 
significant when they switched to a more familiar task. These differences are 
probably due to the ‘executive control’ of the human brain, because task 
switching entails two processing stages. The first stage is involved in the 
process of goal shifting. In the second stage the rules for the new task are 
activated and the rules of the previous process are deactivated, which will 
require more time for new or complex rule sets. Meuter and Allport (1999) 
reported an interesting finding relating to the switching costs from a more 
habitual task to a less frequently done task. In their experiment the subjects 
had to name digits in their first or second language, depending on the colour 
of the background. In switching trials the results showed that the number 
reading was slower in their first language than in their second language. 
 
2.5.2.2 Theories on dual-task inference 
 
Various models try to explain the phenomenon of dual-task inference, 
including the processing bottleneck model, the capacity-sharing model and 
the crosstalk theory. The first model includes a strict processing bottleneck 
and is also known as the single-channel model and refers to the idea that 
certain critical mental operations are carried out sequentially. Operations 
that have to be processed according to this single-channel model lead to a 
bottleneck whenever two tasks require an important mental operation at the 
same time. One explanation for the existence of bottlenecks would be that 
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the brain contains only one mechanism capable of carrying out the required 
operation. Another interpretation would be that two operations that are 
carried out by separate mechanisms inhibit each other, leaving only one 
mechanism operable at a time.  
 
The theory of a central processing bottleneck can be evaluated with the help 
of classical psychological refractory period (PRP) experiments. Here two 
isolated stimuli are presented with variable stimulus onset asynchronies 
(SOA), and the reaction times are recorded. In the basic PRP paradigm, two 
stimuli are presented to subjects in rapid succession and each stimulus 
requires a quick response. Typically, responses to the first stimuli are 
unimpaired, but responses to the second stimuli are slowed by 300 ms or 
more. There is evidence that the second response is delayed due to a 
postponement of the response selection stage. This places the processing 
bottleneck within the central resources that perform response selection for 
diverse tasks (Ruthruff, Johnston & Selst, 2001). 
 
Pashler and Johnston (1989) conducted a PRP experiment with the help of a 
microcomputer. Subjects were required to perform tone recognition and 
letter recognition tasks. For task 1, the subjects had to distinguish between a 
300-Hz tone and a 900-Hz tone. For task 2, the subjects had to recognise 
one of the following letters ‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘C’. Three SOA of 50, 100 or 400 ms 
were tested in the experiment. In a control experiment only task 1 needed to 
be completed and no response to the presented task 2 stimuli was required. 
The mean reaction time (RT) for all SOA was about 600 ms. At the 400-ms 
SOA the RT2 was a little over 600 ms, but at the 50-ms SOA the RT2 was 
found to be 850 ms. The delay of several hundred ms in responding to the 
second stimulus can be attributed to a ‘buffer and switch’ effect. The shorter 
SOA had no effect on the error rate with regard to choosing the correct item 
in task 2. The data further showed that RT1 in the dual-task condition was 
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not significantly influenced by the different SOA but was overall slower than 
in the control experiment, which did not include a secondary stimulus. 
 
The second concept suggests a capacity-sharing model whereby mental 
operations are processed in parallel, but the number of processes running is 
limited by the amount of resources available at this point in time. The 
parallel-running operations have to share the available processing resources 
and therefore the rate or efficiency of the processing depends on the 
capacity available to each task. The third concept attributes interference to 
crosstalk or other impairment in performance that depends on the specific 
nature of the processed information. It is assumed that two similar tasks 
interfere with each other to a greater degree than two different tasks 
(James, 1890). The amount of interference depends on the similarity or 
confusability of the mental representations involved in each task and the 
need to keep each task’s processing streams separate is therefore a possible 
cause of dual-task interference (Navon & Miller, 1987).  
 
The crosstalk theory is not entirely incompatible with the bottleneck concept;   
even so, one could argue that certain mental operations have to run 
sequentially in order to avoid crosstalk (Kinsbourne, 1981). So far no 
evidence confirming crosstalk interference with regard to the processing of 
multiple items has been found since the inference can be caused by tasks 
involving similar or different sorts of judgements (Duncan, 1993). Inputs 
involving a single sensory modality such as audition or vision have been 
shown to lead to a stronger interference than inputs presented in different 
modalities (Treisman & Davies, 1973). A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that the identification of a stimulus needs specific processing 
resources for each sensory modality. Particular perceptual discriminations 
need different amounts of processing capacity which can be allocated as long 
as total capacity demands are not exceeded, since that would reduce 
47 
 
efficiency. The three concepts mentioned above open the possibility for the 
construction of various hybrids.  
 
 
2.5.3 Temporal perception in a multiple-task environment 
 
 
The hypothesis that attention plays a significant role in the perception of 
duration has been confirmed by an extensive amount of literature. Important 
work in this field has been done by researchers such as Creelman, (1962), 
Treisman, (1963), Cantor and Thomas, (1977), Thomas and Brown, (1974), 
Thomas and Cantor, (1978), Thomas and Weaver, (1975), Hicks, Miller, 
Gaes and Biederman, (1977) Hicks, Miller and Kinsbourne, (1976). They 
proposed attentional allocation or distraction models predicting that attention 
to a matter can lead to an increase or decrease in the subjective experience 
of objective time units. The model is built on the principle that the processing 
of non temporal information interferes with the processing of temporal 
information to such a degree that the judged duration decreases and the 
process of time estimation becomes more unreliable. Distortions in time 
perception can be attributed to the fact that attention is directed toward a 
secondary task and there are therefore not sufficient attentional resources 
free to record cues for the passage of time. The lack of proper time cues 
could therefore lead to an underestimation of the experienced duration 
(Fraisse, 1963).  
 
Another possible explanation of the phenomenon of SET is that the number 
of units of temporal information processed is boosted above the normal 
baseline whenever an observer orients his or her attention to an improbable 
event. It is assumed that the attention given to an external stimulus 
animates the counter to count more units and this results in a boost of the 
information processing of that stimulus which results in an expansion of the 
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perceived time. The missed temporal cues theory and the attentional boost 
theory must not be seen as oppositional or mutually exclusive since they 
both expect the cause of the distortions in perceived duration to be found in 
a counter or some or other mechanism that measures the amount of 
information processed for the calculation of the duration of perceived events 
(Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Treisman, 1963). 
 
The majority of research in the time literature supports a model according to 
which the amount of allocated attention to a task has an effect on the 
duration of an event. What needs to be established is whether the expansion 
in perceived duration can be attributed to the attention allocated or to the 
amount of information processed. If it is true that attention increases the 
amount of stimulus information processing then one has difficultly to 
separate these two influencing factors. The allocation of attentional resources 
must be regarded as a major factor due to the following four facts: 
 
• The first fact to consider in this regard is that at least 120–150 ms are 
necessary before attention can be allocated to a new stimulus due to 
the findings that there is an expansion of perceived durations for 
objective durations above 120 ms but none for objective durations 
below this time span (Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993; 
Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989). 
• The second important fact is that attention is believed to be composed 
of two components: one transient or exogenous and one sustained or 
endogenous (Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989). The attentional 
components have two different temporal dynamics and this should be 
visible from time’s subjective expansion (TSE) data.  
• The third factor to be reflected on is that attention is a central process 
and that the visual and auditory modalities are exerted by this process 
in a similar way.  
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• The last important fact is that, attention cannot be applied to the 
perceived image itself but only to information that has been pre-
attentively processed by processes such as grouping, shaping 
formation or similar processes (Baylis & Driver, 1995; He & 
Nakayama, 1992; Rensink & Enns, 1995). Therefore TSE cannot be 
regarded as function of image novelty but as a function of the novelty 
of pre-attentively processed information. 
 
The influence of two concurrent tasks on the estimation of durations was 
studied by Hemmes, Brown and Kladopoulos (2004). Subjects were exposed 
to durations ranging from 2 to 23 s, once with and once without a concurrent 
number-reading task. The results of the study are in accordance with the 
attentional resource allocation model since the perceived duration decreased 
under concurrent task conditions. These findings can also be interpreted 
according to the perceptual hypothesis which argues that different sources of 
sensory input under task and non-task conditions control temporal 
perception. Under non-task conditions the subjects based their time 
estimation on chronometric counting since it is easier to subdivide long 
durations into short time periods. With the additional number reading task it 
was not possible for the subjects to count (Hemmes, Brown & Kladopoulos, 
2004). Due to these results the subjects of the temporal reproduction task 
were advised not to count to aide them with the estimation of longer 
durations since this would influence the outcome of the experiment.  
 
Wilsoncroft and Stone (1976) tested the validity of the storage-size model 
proposed by Ornstein (1969). They included a secondary task at different 
difficulty levels and investigated whether an increase in difficulty would lead 
to an increased duration underestimation. The factorial design included a 1-
digit x 1-digit and a 2-digit x 1-digit task, with the difficulty levels easy for 
small multipliers and hard for high multipliers. The 2-digit x 1-digit easy task 
resulted in the highest underestimation of work duration and therefore only 
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provided partial support for the hypothesis that rising cognitive demands 
shorten a perceived time span. The hypothesis regarding STM control of time 
estimation proposes that temporal information is accumulated in short-term 
memory, and that the concurrent non temporal processing that takes place 
in STM disrupts the accumulation process. To prove this theory Fortin and 
Rousseau (1998) conducted a study in which they evaluated the effects of 
STM processing during the encoding period of the interval and the 
reproduction phase of the interval. The results show that time estimation 
may be interrupted during both periods. 
 
The storage-size model suggests that more stimuli use up a greater quantity 
of memory storage space and therefore lengthen the perceived time based 
on the classic filled-duration illusion. The change and segmentation model 
takes a different approach and introduces the idea that more stimulus events 
do not always correspond to more perceived changes and consequently lead 
to longer time judgements. Poynter and Homa, (1983) proposed that greater 
numbers of stimulus events will not necessarily lengthen the perceived time, 
and that expansion of the perceived duration only occurs if the events form 
very discrete and distinctive chunks. According to him undifferentiated 
additional stimuli will have no effect on the perception of time. The same 
principle can be applied to moving objects; a greater number of moving 
stimuli would only lead to a lengthening of perceived time if they are highly 
distinctive, perhaps travelling at different speeds on identifiably different 
routes. One example of the gestalt principle of common fate is a flock of 
birds in flight. The flock of birds is perceived to be a single entity rather than 
comprised of separate individuals (Wertheimer, 1958). 
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2.5.4 Basic concepts of memory 
 
 
Memory processes can be divided into short-term memory (STM) and long-
term memory (LTM) processes. There are two types of LTM storage 
mechanism. One is called episodic memory and the other semantic memory. 
Episodic memory stands for the memory of events and experiences in a 
serial form. The knowledge of the order in which events took place makes it 
possible to reconstruct the actual events that took place at a given point in 
time. Semantic memory consists of skills, general knowledge as well as 
conceptual structure (Tulving, 1972). LTM processes can further be 
subdivided into the three main activities of storage, deletion and retrieval. 
Information from STM is stored in LTM by the rehearsal of a piece of 
information or the process of repeated exposure to a stimulus. Additional 
learning has been proven to be most effective if it is distributed over time. 
Deletion is mainly caused by decay and interference.   
 
The reason why previously stored information becomes unavailable has not 
been clarified yet since it is questionable whether information is forgotten 
and permanently lost or whether it only becomes increasingly difficult to 
retrieve certain items from memory. Information that cannot be recalled can 
in some instances be recognised or recalled with prompting. There are two 
types of information retrieval: recall and recognition. In recall, the 
information is reproduced from memory while the process of recognition 
supplies the knowledge that the information has been seen previously 
(Lockhart, 2000). Recognition is a less complex process since the information 
is provided as a cue and this aids the retrieval process (Standing, Conezio & 
Haber, 1970).   
 
The span of absolute judgement and the span of immediate memory impose 
severe limitations on the amount of information that can be received, 
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processed, and remembered. If the new information is not meaningfully 
encoded or rehearsed within working memory, the information stored in STM 
decays rapidly, because STM only has a limited holding capacity. The visual 
image store, called ‘iconic memory’, decays quickly in less than one second 
and the auditory image store, called ‘echoic memory’, can last up to four 
seconds (Beatty, 1995).  
 
By organising the stimulus input simultaneously into several dimensions and 
successively into a sequence or chunks it is possible to break the 
informational bottleneck. The successful formation of a chunk is known as 
closure, and without rehearsal the average person can hold about four 
chunks in STM. The chunking of information is the most effective way to 
increase the STM capacity; the most effective way to remember numbers is 
to place them into chunks of four digits. Therefore it is easier to remember a 
long number by partitioning it than attempting to keep a single long number 
in mind. The amount of numbers that an individual can store in STM is 
around seven items, plus minus two (Miller, 1956).  
 
2.5.4.1 Factors influencing memory performance 
 
Interference can lead to a disturbance in STM retention, and this accounts for 
the need to complete the tasks held in STM as fast as possible to avoid 
information loss. According to the interference theory of forgetting, new 
information interferes with and ultimately displaces the old information 
stored in STM. Peterson and Peterson (1959) conducted a study investigating 
the ability to recall information after different time delays ranging from 3 to 
18 s. The subjects had to remember three letters and their correct number of 
recalls dropped significantly with the length of the delay time. After 3 s the 
letters were recalled correctly only half of the time and after 12 s the three-
consonant groups were only seldom recalled.  
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There are two different kinds of interference in psychological theory. The first 
is retroactive interference and is caused by an activity that has occurred 
after something has been learned. The second is proactive interference and 
is caused by inference occurring before the encoding of new information. 
Research findings suggest that both types of interference are responsible for 
the loss of information; even so, it seems as if proactive interference pays a 
greater role (Keppel & Underwood, 1962). 
 
Another factor besides interference that can lead to information loss is 
stress. It has been shown that stress has a complex effect on memory. 
Memory for non emotional experience is preserved or even strengthened 
under the influence of stress, but memory for the neutral elements of the 
emotional experience is reduced. These contradictory findings can be 
explained by the fact that stress hormones potentiate the functioning of the 
amygdala which inhibits the working of the hippocampus. Stress-related 
memory impairment is found in studies of the hippocampus since this part of 
the brain is known to be vital for any kind of normal episodic memory 
function (de Quervain, Henke, Aerni, Treyer, McGaugh, Berthold, Nitsch, 
Buck, Roozendaal & Hock, 2003). At high levels the stress hormone cortisol 
disrupts the hippocampal function and impairs episodic memory since the 
hippocampus is densely packed with receptors for this substance and 
sustained exposure to high cortisol levels can even damage the part of the 
brain that sub serves learning and memory (Kim & Diamond, 2002). 
 
2.5.4.2 Impact of concurrent tasks on resources allocation and memory 
 
The storage and retrieval process of information itself is limited by people’s 
working memory capacity and could be negatively influenced by concurrently 
processed information. The connection between ‘attention’ and short-term 
retention is of significance here since people have selective control over what 
information they hold onto for immediate report. Classic partial-report 
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experiments involving audition (Darwin, Turvey & Crowder, 1972) and vision 
(Sperling, 1960) investigate the transfer of items into short- term memory 
with the help of cued elements such as the position or colour of a letter. 
Another way that attentional limitations has been studied, entails examining 
the transfer of information into STM while the test subject performs a 
secondary unrelated task. This approach makes it possible to evaluate 
whether the transfer of information into STM is subjected to the same central 
bottleneck when two stimuli are closely positioned, which causes a delay in 
processing called the “psychological refractory period” (PRP) effect (Pashler, 
1984).  
 
To answer this question Murdock (1965) conducted a dual-task experiment 
whereby subjects listened to a spoken list of words while sorting cards. After 
completion of the task they were asked to repeat the items back in any 
order. Having to retrieve information without any given cue is known as ‘free 
recall’. The memory for the last-presented items the ‘recency effect’, was 
reasonably intact indicating that the secondary sorting task had no 
significant negative impact on the storage of the words in the STM of the test 
subjects. The findings provide evidence that the encoding of auditory 
information does not involve the same cognitive mechanisms that are 
implicated in the process of sorting cards. 
 
 
2.6 OVERWIEV OF THE THEORETICAL VIEWPOINT ADOPTED BY THE STUDY 
 
 
Long SRTs caused by slow or badly designed software can cause irritation 
and a negative work attitude. They are also undesirable from an economic 
standpoint because they limit the number of operations per time cycle. The 
common design guideline, ‘the faster the better’, is not always appropriate 
because users need a certain amount of time to achieve readiness for task 
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execution. The optimum SRT must be determined empirically for a particular 
kind of task, since the more information that have to be connected in STM, 
the longer the SRT that is required (Kohlisch & Kuhmann, 1997).  
 
The results of a study conducted by Martin and Corl (1986) indicate that the 
cognitive demands of a task need to be considered in regard to the optimum 
SRT. They tested the idea that reducing computer SRTs from a few seconds 
to sub second levels highly increases user productivity. Subjects had to 
complete data-entry and problem-solving tasks with eight different SRTs 
between 0.1 and 5 s. The results pointed out that some increase in 
productivity did occur as SRTs decreased. However, this effect only occurred 
in data entry tasks and disappeared in problem-solving tasks and also 
declined in strength as data entry tasks became more complex. The 
relationship between time and productivity was linear, indicating that a 
shorter SRT did not accelerate the completion of more demanding tasks.    
 
In this study the relationship between SRT and proper task performance is 
explored in the context of a simulated driving task.  The specific research 
questions that will be investigated in this simulated driving setting, are 
described below.   
 
 
2.7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
In the temporal reproduction task short durations will be overestimated and 
long durations will be underestimated, verifying the principles of Vierordt’s 
law.  
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This hypothesis is aimed at replicating the findings obtained from a study 
conducted by Wearden (2003). He investigated the validity of Vierordt’s law 
and found that Vierordt-type effects are present regardless of the threshold 
value. The results of Wearden’s study indicate that reproduced mean times 
overshoot target times to a higher degree when the target times were short 
than when they were long. Short target times have been found to be 
‘overestimated’ while long target times were ‘underestimated’ with threshold 
values ranging between 30% and 40%. The existence of an ‘indifference’ 
point where the mean reproduction is supposed to be perfectly accurate was 
of further interest in this study. For the 30% and 40% thresholds the 
indifference point was found between 600 ms and 800 ms. It is anticipated 
that an ‘indifference’ point will be visible in the results of the temporal 
reproduction experiment included in this study. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
It is assumed that there will be a statistically significant relationship between 
acceleration and braking behaviour and the length of the SRT. The number of 
significant brakes (SBs) will increase under short SRTs. Acceleration and 
deceleration will also become more volatile, resulting in a higher standard 
deviation, which is a measure of the dispersion of the numbers from their 
expected mean value. The standard deviation of the positive acceleration 
(SDPA) as well as the standard deviation of the negative acceleration (SDNA) 
will therefore increase in magnitude under short SRTs.  
 
Research findings validating the impact on braking behaviour were previously 
provided by Hancock, Simmons, Hasemi, Howarth and Ranney (1999). They 
investigated the effects of in-vehicle distractions on driver response during a 
crucial driving manoeuvre. During a simulated driving task, the drivers 
responded to the in-vehicle task using a touch screen. Having to perform a 
secondary task that shifted the eye focus away from the road led to a 
decrease in braking reaction time at changing traffic lights and the drivers 
57 
 
compensated for the late detection by breaking more intensely. In order to 
make appropriate braking decisions the driver has to detect relevant 
information from the environment and therefore his or her decision to 
braking is dependent on visual input (Lee, 1976). It is reasonable to assume 
that these previously established results will be repeated in the current 
study, since there is some overlap between the studies given that the 
driver’s visual attention has to be divided between two tasks in both cases. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Driving parameters regarding the position of the car are also expected to be 
negatively affected under the shorter SRTs. The number of steering 
movements (SM) and the number of incidences of crossing the outside line 
(COL) are expected to increase significantly during short SRT.  
 
Breaking behaviour is not the only driving parameter found to be affected by 
a secondary in-vehicle task. Noy, Lemoine, Klachan and Burns
 
 (2004) looked 
at the connection between three different secondary tasks and the driving 
performance measures such as standard deviation of lane position (SDLP) 
and number of lane exceeds (NLE) or line crossings. The baseline driving 
scenario had significantly smaller values for SDLP than all of the dual-task 
driving scenarios. No noteworthy variations were found among the scrolling 
visual search task, a static visual search task, and a radio-tuning task. The 
NLE was significantly different across the four driving tasks. There were 
significantly fewer line crossings during the baseline driving scenario. During 
the less cognitively demanding scrolling and visual search task the subjects 
also performed better than during the more demanding radio-tuning task. 
These findings support the hypothesis that the increased difficulty of driving 
under short SRTs will have a statistically significant impact on the number of 
outside line crossings. 
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Hypothesis 4 
The high demand on attentional resources during the short SRTs will force 
the drivers to switch their focus more often between the road and the game 
monitor, resulting in a high gaze frequency. The gaze frequency measured in 
gazes per minute will increase significantly during short SRTs, and the 
average focus time on the game monitor should therefore decrease to a 
significant degree during the short SRTs. 
 
Hypothesis 5 
The distribution of gazes within the various SRTs will not be influenced by 
their duration. The subjects will switch at a constant frequency between two 
tasks. 
 
The high frequency of gaze shifts can be interpreted as an automatic process 
that splits the attention between the two tasks independently of the 
temporal-estimation abilities of the subjects. Previous research findings 
indicate that humans are equipped with a range of memory buffers that 
enable them to employ a ‘buffer and switch’ processing strategy in order to 
process numerous tasks concurrently (Baddeley, 1986). 
                             
Hypothesis 6 
The performance with regard to correctly remembered items in the memory 
game will not be influenced by the SRTs. 
 
Evidence showing that central capacity demands do not have a significant 
impact on the functioning of visual STM was provided by Anderson and Craik 
(1974). They presented a list of spoken words concurrently to a 
visual/manual choice reaction-time task. In a similar test subjects had to 
make a fast-choice response to a tone. After the response they were 
abruptly presented with a pattern of black and white squares. The 
information about the patterns was stored in visual STM without interference 
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from the secondary task. This indicates that the subjects were able to 
maintain good performance and were not negatively influenced by the 
temporal overlap of the two tasks (Pashler, 1993). The assumption made in 
this research is, therefore, that memory performance will not deteriorate 
under the elevated central capacity demands.    
 
Hypothesis 7 
The subjective state of the test subjects, indicating how they personally 
experienced performing the simulated driving task, will be influenced 
significantly by the duration of the SRT.  
 
The subjective state will be measured with four variables. Regarding the 
subjects’ mood, the levels of stress and boredom will be assessed and rated 
as low, medium or high. Their ability to cope with the multiple concurrent 
tasks given to them will also be measured. For this they will rate the time 
provided for task completion as either too short, a convenient length or too 
long. Additionally, the effect of the SRT on their driving performance will be 
investigated in the same way. It is expected that the ranking of stress will be 
significantly higher for short SRTs. The opposite will be found for the ranking 
of boredom, which is expected to be significantly lower for short SRTs. The 
time granted for task completion and good driving performance is anticipated 
to be rated significantly more often as too short for the short SRTs. 
 
The importance of finding the best SRT to improve task performance was the 
focus point of research undertaken by Kuhmann, Boucsein, Schaefer and 
Alexander (1987). Apart from physiological measurements, they also 
investigated the impact of the duration of various SRTs on the subjective 
state of the subjects. While aiming at finding the optimum duration for a 
simple detection and correction task, Kuhmann and his colleagues tested 
short, medium and long SRTs ranging from 1 to 9 s. They measured heart 
rate, electrodermal activity, and blood pressure, and employed subjective 
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measures of mood and psychological well-being. They found that short SRTs 
induced frequent incidences of headache and eye pain and resulted in poor 
performance and increased cardiovascular activity. Short SRTs did not enable 
the users to achieve readiness for task execution and generated stress. The 
long SRTs achieved the lowest mean error rate and the lowest systolic blood 
pressure and did not lead to differences in working speed. An indication of 
irritation during long inter-task delay is provided by the higher number of 
skin conductance reactions.  
 
Medium SRTs gave the best results in terms of task completion time, 
reaction time and error rate. They further led to a moderate heart rate and 
reduced the incidences of negative self-assessment (Kohlisch & Kuhmann, 
1997; Kuhmann et al., 1987; Kuhmann, 1989). It therefore appears from 
this research that the medium-duration SRTs will receive the best marks in 
the subjective-state questionnaire. It is anticipated that medium SRTs will 
provide the best results, indicating medium amounts of stress and boredom. 
Medium-length SRTs will further offer a convenient waiting period, allowing 
optimum task completion and driving performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
The study is based on an experimental paradigm and attempts to provide 
answers to specific research questions about the effects of system response 
times on visual attention, driving performance and subjective state during a 
simulated driving task. In order to answer the proposed research questions, 
a quantitative study was used because numerical data serve best to establish 
the relationship between the tested parameters. 
 
 
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
 
In this study a convenient sample of 10 licensed drivers was used.  The 
sample consisted mainly of employees of the Generation Research Program 
(GRP) in Bad Toelz in Germany, where the experiments were carried out. The 
driving simulator can induce nausea, and it takes over an hour to complete 
all the test rounds in this experiment.  For these reasons, some employees of 
the institute were used because they had been desensitised against motion 
sickness by taking part in numerous experiments at the institute.  
 
The sample consisted of 3 females and 7 males between the ages of 22 and 
64, and the mean age was 38.5 years. The wide age range can influence the 
results of the experiment, but the older subjects had more drive experience 
to compensate for any disadvantage in regard to their cognitive abilities. 
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Subjects who were not familiar with the driving simulator were given a 
training session of 15 minutes. All subjects were familiar with the use of 
touch screens. All subjects were paid 40 euro for their participation. The 
number of subjects was kept small since there were practical difficulties in 
recruiting suitable test subjects, and all the gathered data had to be 
analysed manually in a very time-consuming manner.  
 
Due to the small sample size, it is not possible to verify that the data are 
normally distributed and parametric techniques can therefore not be applied.  
For this reason, two non-parametric techniques, Spearman’s rho and 
Kendaul’s tau, were used to analyse the data. 
 
 
3.3 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
3.3.1 Experiment 1: temporal reproduction 
 
 
The subjects were placed in front of a standard PC using a keyboard as input 
device. The computer program used was created with MatLab 5 (Pratap, 
1999). In a training round the subjects were made familiar with the task. 
First the subjects had to memorise two symbols. Then a white square was 
presented to them on the computer screen for a duration of 1, 3, 6, 12, 20 
or 30 s in a different randomised order for each subject. After that the white 
square was replaced by a yellow square. When the subject decided that the 
yellow square had been visible for the same duration as the white square he 
or she pressed a key. After this task the subjects were presented with one 
symbol and asked to indicate whether it had been shown to them prior to the 
temporal reproduction task. The subjects were instructed not to count during 
the temporal reproduction task. 
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3.3.2 Experiment 2: driving simulator  
 
 
Diagram 3.1: Side view of driving simulator setup 
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Diagram 3.2: Top view of setup 
 
 
 
The experiment was carried out on a static driving simulator. The set up of 
the driving simulator is represented in Diagram 3.1 and Diagram 3.2. The 
visual simulation provided a front view of 120 degrees and a rear-view 
through all three rear mirrors. Car and road sounds were simulated. A touch 
screen displaying the game was mounted on the middle console next to the 
steering wheel. The simulation consisted of a round course on a normal one-
lane road with no oncoming traffic and under good weather conditions. The 
subjects were instructed to follow a car travelling at a speed of 70 km/h at a 
safe driving distance. The eye movements of the test subjects were recorded 
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with a video camera. Another video camera recorded the touch screen of the 
game and a third video camera recorded the front screen of the driving 
simulator. With the help of a quad processor, a four-split screen was 
produced. In the fourth partition of the screen a digital stop watch was 
displayed. A video recorder with a jog shuttle was used so that the exact 
time of the eye movements could be established. With this set-up it was 
possible to manually record the beginning and end of each eye movement.  
 
The operation of a technical system was imitated with the use of a memory 
game. From a pool of 16 items the subjects were shown four items for the 
duration of 15 s. The subjects were required to remember the items in the 
presented sequence. After the items had been presented, a selection field 
with16 items was presented and the subjects had to identify the items 
presented to them in this field. Following each selection, the subject had to 
wait until the next selection field appeared, and after they had selected all 
four items, they were given four new items to learn. The subjects completed 
eight rounds for each of the seven SRTs of 0, 1, 3, 6, 12, 20 or 30 s and one 
round consisted of four separate games. Under the 0 s SRT the system 
responded without additionally added delay time within approximately 300 
ms. The SRTs were presented to each subject in a different randomised 
order. An inter-task delay of 6 s was introduced between each game. The 
subjects were given an encoding time of 15 s to memorise the items while 
driving and were instructed to complete the game as fast as possible; they 
were also informed about the duration of the tested SRT.  
 
Prior to the tests in the driving simulator the subjects took part in a training 
session consisting of eight rounds with a delay of 3 s and 8 rounds with a 
delay of 0 s to familiarise them with the memory game. Before the first 
training round the subjects were presented with examples of all 16 items so 
they could give names to them. This procedure was repeated after the 
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training rounds. This was done to safeguard against a change in memory 
strategies from visual to verbal encoding methods. 
 
The independent variable in this experiment was the duration of the SRT. 
The dependent variable was the eye movement from road to monitor. The 
duration of fixation and frequency of change were of interest here.  Another 
dependent variable was the number of wrongly selected items in the memory 
game. Dependent variables concerning the drive performance of the subjects 
were also recorded.  These variables included the amount of significant 
brakes (SBs), the standard deviation of the positive acceleration (SDPA), the 
standard deviation of the negative acceleration (SDNA), the number of 
steering movements (SM) and the number of incidences of crossing the 
outside line (COL). In addition, the incidences of crossing the middle lane 
and line crossings per mile for the total duration, as well as incidences of 
leaving the lane were also documented. 
 
 
3.3.3 Subjective state questionnaire 
 
 
After the completion of eight rounds with a certain SRT the subjects were 
asked about the influence the different delay times had on their performance 
and their subjective experience in regard to the amount of stress and 
boredom they experienced during the simulated driving task. The effects on 
task completion and driving performance were evaluated on a three-point 
scale (1 = to short, 2 = convenient and 3 = to long).  The subjective state of 
the subjects in terms of stress and boredom was also evaluated on a three 
point scale (1 = low, 2 = medium and 3 = high). The questionnaire was self-
constructed and may therefore lack reliability and validity but the findings 
can give an indication of the subjective state of the subjects. 
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3.4 VALIDITY AND RELIABLITY 
 
 
The validity of the memory game itself with regard to the simulation of a 
navigation system raises some issues. The task is simpler that a real 
navigation system because the use of a navigation system requires that  the 
user  enters letters and numbers to specify a certain destination address, 
and the menus of navigation system and on-board computers are often 
complicated and include a vast amount of functions. Noel, Nonnecke and 
Trick (2005) investigated the ability to learn and memories the functioning of 
in-car navigation devices and looked at the problems first time users of a 
specific navigation system encountered. 
 
The destination input tasks itself was problematic since some subjects exited 
the address input menus several times by clicking on a button that brought 
them elsewhere in the system and many subjects had to input the same 
addresses multiple times. The subjects initially encountered difficulties in 
recognising the functions of some controls, such as the pull-down menus for 
the destination entry. However, this problem cleared up after the second 
session, and did not occur again after that.  During the study it became 
apparent that the subjects generally had less problems the second time they 
operated the navigation system. The subjects were able to remember 
choices concerning the selection of one item over another, but they could not 
remember more complicated mechanisms (Noel, Nonnecke & Trick, 2005).    
 
Because many different types of navigation system with different menu set-
ups and functions are available, in this study a memory game was used to 
simulate the memory and recognition processes involved in operating a 
navigation system. The rules of the memory game were easier to be learnt 
by the test subjects than the operation of most navigation systems and 
therefore the use of the memory game was efficient in terms of time.  The 
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memory game was intended to simulate the memory and recognition 
processes involved in operating a navigation system.  In such systems, the 
user has to remember the functions of certain menu items and recognise and 
select them. When using menu functions that need numerous selection steps 
the user has also to bear in mind at which point in the menu he or she 
currently is and which further steps are required to access the desired 
function. The memory game simulates parts of this process because it 
requires that the user remembers four items in the correct order. The 
memory game is based on simple abstract symbols that have to be encoded, 
which simulates the functioning of a menu system in a real navigation 
systems.  With regard to these aspects the memory game can be seen as a 
valid instrument to simulate the operation of a navigation system. 
 
With regard to the validity of the obtained data it has to be considered that 
the symptoms of simulator sickness could have affected the performance of 
the subjects. These symptoms could have led to loss of motivation and 
interfere with the normal attention allocation process. The subjects were 
further distracted by the fact that they were placed in a virtual driving 
environment which evoked the feeling that something was not quite right 
(Mollenhauer, Romano, & Brumm, 2004). Many different driving simulator 
designs are currently employed and therefore validity issues have to be 
taken into consideration. A lack of standardisation in the areas of simulator 
graphics, audio and movement as well as scenario design and validation 
needs to be addressed.  
 
There are several factors that can compromise the validity of the 
experiment: 
 
• When subjects are asked to reproduce a certain time period, they can 
count internally during the presented time period, and then use this as 
an aid when reproducing the time span. To prevent this from 
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occurring, the subjects were instructed not to count during the 
temporal reproduction task, but there is of course no guarantee that 
they did not use counting as a memory aid.   
• Age may have an effect on retrospective duration judgements. Given 
that this study used subjects of various ages ranging 20 to 64, this 
needs to be taken into consideration.  
• Fatigue, low attention span and motion sickness could have affected 
performance.  
• The driving experience of the test person. Even though only subjects 
with a driving license were used the individual differences in drive 
experience possibly influenced their ability to handle the secondary 
tasks while driving.  
• The possibility of peripheral vision of display change, but this was 
prevented with a special designed interface of the game that used blue 
and green colours with similar brightness levels.  
 
Other issues that need clarification are the subjects’ adaptation to the virtual 
environment and their comfort levels. The selection of performance 
measures and the technical standards for reporting the experimental set-up 
and results also need to be standardised (Rizzo, 2004).  Nevertheless, for 
the study the use of simulation was more cost effective, less dangerous, 
faster or otherwise more practical than experimenting with a real system. 
The recorded video material was analysed manually; this provided a 
possibility for an inaccurate reading of the eye movements. The manual set-
up proved to be more reliable than using eye-tracing software, which often 
needed to be recalibrated and prolonged the driving sessions of the subjects.  
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3.5. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
The process and purpose of the test in the time laboratory were explained to 
the subjects. The purpose of the test in the driving simulator, to record the 
shift of visual attention from the road to the screen, was only revealed to the 
subjects after completion of the test since this could have influenced their 
performance. The subjects were informed that they could stop the 
experiment in the driving simulator any time if they felt uncomfortable or 
tired. All gathered data was kept confidential and each subject signed the 
consent form. 
 
One concern when conducting experiments in a driving simulator was the 
appearance of Vertigo. This is a type of dizziness that is characterised by the 
sensation of spinning. It is sometimes referred to as a hallucination of 
motion. It can be induced by virtual environments where the mind is 
exposed to the illusion of movement while the body stays stationary (Regan, 
1993). A theoretical explanation of this phenomenon is provided by the 
sensory conflict theory and the postural instability theory. The sensory 
conflict theory posits that there is a conflict between motion information 
obtained from various sensory systems (visual, vestibular, and 
proprioceptive systems) and learned representations of what those inputs 
should be in a given environment. The mismatch generated by the conflicting 
sensory patterns is theorised to result in both motion sickness and, with 
time, adaptation (Reason & Brand, 1975).  
 
The postural instability theory hypothesises that motion sickness is caused 
by a breakdown in postural stability. According to the postural instability 
theory, motion sickness occurs when the organism encounters an 
environment for which it has not learned the requisite strategy for 
maintaining postural stability (Riccio & Stoffregen, 1991). Postural stability is 
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defined as the coordinated stabilisation of all body segments. Common 
symptoms are light-headedness, feeling faint, unsteadiness, a false 
sensation of movement, either of the self or the external environment, 
confusion and nausea. Additional symptoms that can appear are unusual eye 
movements, such as flitting of the eyes (nystagmus), headache, vomiting, 
ringing sound in the ears (tinnitus), speech difficulties, such as slurring, 
deafness, muscular weakness, staggering gait and loss of coordination 
(ataxia) and loss of consciousness (Kenny, Hettinger & Lilienthal, 1988). 
About one third of the population is highly susceptible to motion sickness, a 
third experiences it in fairly rough conditions and another third only becomes 
sick in extreme conditions. The subjects of the study were informed about 
the symptoms and advised to look for early warning signs such as sweating 
and nausea and were instructed to stop the experiment in case they 
experienced any of these symptoms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
The experiment was completed by all 10 human subjects. The mean amount 
of years concerning drive experience was 19.8 years, ranging from 4 to 46 
years of drive experience. All the subjects were right handed.  
 
 
4.1 EFFECTS OF SRTS ON DRIVE PERFORMANCE, VISUAL ATTENTION, 
SUBJECTIVE STATE AND TIME ESTIMATION 
 
 
As previously pointed out, nonparametric statistics were utilised for the 
statistical analysis of all gathered data. These techniques make it possible to 
process data of ‘low quality’ from small samples, and to analyse variables 
about which nothing is known with regard to their distribution. 
Nonparametric methods do not rely on the estimation of parameters such as 
the mean or the standard deviation (SD), which describes the distribution of 
the variable of interest in the population. Therefore, these methods are also 
sometimes known as parameter-free methods or distribution-free methods. 
 
The first nonparametric method used is known as the Spearman R, which is 
similar to the regular Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient with 
regard to the proportion of variability accounted for. The only difference is 
that the Spearman R is computed from ranks. A prerequisite for using the 
Spearman R is that the variables under consideration should be measured on 
at least an ordinal scale. The second method, the Kendall tau rank 
correlation coefficient also known as the Kendall tau coefficient or Kendall's τ 
or tau test, is a non-parametric statistic used to measure the strength of 
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association of the cross-tabulations. It measures the degree of 
correspondence between two rankings and assesses the significance of this 
correspondence. The tau b tests is applied when both variables are measured 
at the ordinal level since it makes adjustments for ties and is most suitable 
for square tables. Values range from -1 for negative association, or perfect 
inversion to +1 for positive association, or perfect agreement. The absence 
of any association is shown by a value of zero. 
 
 
4.1.1 Temporal reproduction in dual-task setting  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Over- and underestimation of measured time span in the 
temporal reproduction task 
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Table 4.1: Average number of over- and underestimation in reproduction 
task 
 
SRT 1 3 6 12 20 30 
In ms 359.90 67.00 -13.30 -414.20 -3796.80 -6970.80 
 
The box plot diagram in Figure 4.1 illustrates to what extent a subject failed 
to reproduce the pre-established time period accurately. From Table 4.1 it is 
clearly visible that the short SRT durations of 1s and 3s have been 
overestimated. The medium and long time intervals of 6s, 12s, 20s and 30s 
have been underestimated in the temporal reproduction task. Based on the 
results of the study, the principles of Vierordt’s law and the stated hypothesis 
were therefore confirmed. The existence of an ‘indifference’ point where the 
mean reproduction is supposed to be perfect was located close to a 6s delay 
in this experiment. At this duration the average underestimation only 
amounted to 13.3 ms. 
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4.1.2 Effects of SRT duration on breaking, acceleration and deceleration  
 
4.1.2.1 Number of significant brakes  
 
Figure 4.2: Number of SBs per driven kilometre under each SRT 
 
 
Table 4.2: Average number of SBs per driven kilometre   
 
SRT 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
SBs 0.2900 0.2410 0.1878 0.1240 0.1220 0.0980 0.1020 
 
The number of SBs per driven kilometre under each of the seven tested SRTs 
is represented in Figure 4.2. In Table 4.2 the mean numbers of SBs per 
driven kilometre are visible, showing a steady decline of brakes with the 
lengthening of the SRT. Under the 0s delay, which gives the user only about 
300 ms until the system is ready again, the highest numbers of brakes has 
been indicated. In order to prove that the high mental load placed on the 
driver during the short will have a statistically relevant impact on his or her 
breaking behaviour, a two-way nonparametric correlation analysis employing 
the method of Spearman R was conducted. As cut-off level for significance 
and as control for the occurrence of type 1 error, a Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
30 20 12 6 3 1 0 
SRT 
1,0 
0,8 
0,6 
0,4 
0,2 
0 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
S
B
s 
18 
53 
63 
76 
 
level of p < .05 was used. The negative correlation between the delay time 
and number of SBs per driven kilometre was significant with a correlation 
coefficient of -.531 (n = 68, p = .000). 
  
4.1.2.2 Standard deviation of average positive acceleration  
 
Figure 4.3: SDPA under each SRT 
 
 
Table 4.3: SDPA 
 
Delay 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
In m/s² 0.4700 0.4710 0.4556 0.3940 0.3560 0.3680 0.3260 
 
In Figure 4.3 the SDPA ranging from 0s to 30s is represented. In Table 4.3 
the SD indicates how strongly the acceleration varies. The SDPA was used to 
show the increased inconsistency in acceleration and deceleration. The SD is 
a measure of dispersion, measuring how widely spread the values are in a 
set of data. A SD is found when many data points are close to the mean. If 
many data points are far from the mean, the SD is large. The SD is zero if all 
data values are equal. The method of Spearman R nonparametric correlation 
analysis was utilised again. A cut-off level for significance of p < .05 was 
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used for this two-tailed analysis. The negative correlation between the delay 
time and the SDPA was significant with a correlation coefficient of -.604 (n = 
68, p = .000). 
 
4.1.2.3 Standard deviation of negative acceleration  
 
Figure 4.4: SDNA under each SRT 
 
 
Table 4.4: SDNA 
 
SRT 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
In                             
m/s² 
0.7167 0.6350 0.6133 0.5790 0.4340 0.4240 0.4020 
 
In Figure 4.4 the SDNA ranging from 0s to 30s is represented. In Table 4.4 
the standard deviation indicates how strongly the acceleration varies. The 
Spearman R nonparametric correlation analysis was employed once more, 
with a cut-off level for significance of p < .05 for this two-tailed analysis. The 
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negative correlation between the delay time and the SDNA was significant 
with a correlation coefficient of -.727 (n = 68, p = .000). 
 
 
4.1.3. Effects of SRT duration on steering and line crossings 
 
4.1.3.1 Number of steering movements 
 
Figure 4.5: Number of SMs per driven kilometre under each SRT 
 
 
Table 4.5: Average number of SMs per driven kilometre 
 
SRT 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
SMs 44.92 42.45 38.26 37.57 36.32 35.10 34.90 
 
The number of SMs per driven kilometre under each SRT is visible in Figure 
4.5, ranging from 0 s to 30 s. In Table 4.5 the mean number of SMs per 
driven kilometre indicates that less steering is taking place under the long 
SRTs. To find out whether this decline is statistically significant, a two-way 
nonparametric correlation analysis employing the method of Spearman R 
was used. The cut-off level for significance was set at p < .05. The negative 
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correlation between the delay time and number of SMs per driven kilometre 
was not significant with a correlation coefficient of -.218 (n = 68, p = .074). 
  
4.1.3.2 Incidences of crossing outside line on total driving duration  
 
Figure 4.6: COL per kilometre on total driving duration under each SRT   
 
 
Table 4.6: Average number of COL per kilometre on total duration under 
each SRT 
 
SRT 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
COL 1.6767 0.2490 0.6133 0.6820 0.3470 0.2260 0.0800 
 
Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6 show how often the drivers crossed the outside line 
in each kilometre they drove for all seven tested SRTs. The data shows that 
the number of crossings declines under longer waiting times. A two-way 
correlation analysis utilising the method of Spearman R was performed. The 
cut-off level for significance was set at p < .05. The negative correlation 
between the delay time and number of incidences of COL per kilometre on 
total driving duration was not significant with a correlation coefficient of 
 -.148 (n = 68, p = .229). 
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4.1.4 Effects of SRT duration on gaze behaviour and gaze adaptation 
 
4.1.4.1 Gaze frequency under each SRT 
           
Figure 4.7: Gazes per minute under each SRT 
 
 
Table 4.7: Number of gazes per minute under each SRT 
 
SRT 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
Gazes 60.2 73.0 38.3 26.0 21.7 14.6 11.8 
Average shift  
interval in s 
0.99 0.82 1.56 2.30 2.75 4.10 5.05 
 
The number of gazes to the game monitor made by the subjects within one 
minute is visible in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.7. A high reduction in the number 
of gazes is apparent with the increase in SRT duration. The method of 
Spearman R was used to analyse the correlation between the number of 
steering movements and the SRT. The cut-off level for significance was set at 
p < .05 and the analysis was two-tailed. The negative correlation between 
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the delay time and mean number of gazes per minute was significant and 
very strong with a correlation coefficient of -.964 (n = 7, p = .000). 
  
4.1.4.2 Average focus time on game monitor under each SRT 
 
Figure 4.8: Average focus time on game monitor under each SRT 
 
  
Table 4.8: Average focus time on game monitor under each SRT 
 
SRT 1 3 6 12 20 30 
In s 0.6218 0.6432 0.6529 0.6761 0.6522 0.6575 
  
The Spearman R nonparametric correlation analysis was utilised once more, 
with a cut-off level for significance of p < .05 for this two-tailed analysis. No 
correlation between the length of the delay time and the mean focus time on 
the monitor was noticed with a correlation coefficient of -.011 (n = 4784, p 
= .432). 
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4.1.5 Distribution of gazes within the various SRTs 
 
 
In order to present the number of gazes to the monitor at any given point in 
time during the various SRTs a division into blocks of 0.5 s was carried out. 
In the histograms Figure 4.8 to Figure 4.12 the number of gazes is displayed 
on the x-axis. The y-axis shows time in a 0.5-s interval. A two-way 
nonparametric correlation analysis employing the method of Spearman R 
was used to analyse the distribution of gazes within the various SRTs. The 
cut-off level of was set at p < .05.  
 
Figure 4.9: Distribution of gazes within the 3-s delay 
 
 
The histogram in Figure 4.9 shows an increase in the number of gazes 
towards the end of the waiting period. The correlation between time and 
number of gazes failed to be significant for the 3-s delay with a correlation 
coefficient of .714 (n = 6, p = .111). 
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of gazes within the 6-s delay 
 
 
For the 6-s delay, the correlation between time and number of gazes was 
significant and positive with a correlation coefficient of .692 (n= 12, p = 
.013). 
 
Figure 4.11: Distribution of gazes within the 12-s delay 
 
 
For the 12-s delay, the correlation between time and number of gazes was 
also significant and positive with a correlation coefficient of .762 (n = 24, p 
= .000). 
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of gazes within the 20-s delay 
 
 
 
The positive correlation between time and number of gazes for the 20-s 
delay, was significant and very strong with a correlation coefficient of .845 (n 
= 40, p = .000). 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of gazes within the 30-s delay 
 
 
The positive correlation between time and number of gazes for the 30-s 
delay was significant and strong with a correlation coefficient of .709 (n = 
60, p = .000). 
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4.1.6 Effects of SRT duration on game performance 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Error rate under each SRT 
 
 
Table 4.9: Average error rate under each SRT 
 
Delay 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
Errors 1 1.8 0.9 1.8 1 0.7 1.5 
  
The Spearman R nonparametric correlation analysis was also used to analyse 
the mean error rate for each tested SRT. The cut-off level for significance of 
p < .05 was chosen for this two-tailed analysis. No significant correlation 
between error rate and the delay time was detected with a correlation 
coefficient of -.035 (n = 70, p = .773). 
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4.1.7 Effects of SRT duration on subjective experience 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Rating for stress and boredom 
 
 
Table 4.10: Rating for stress and boredom 
 
SRT 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
Stress 2.00 2.10 1.70 1.80 1.30 1.40 1.71 
Boredom 1.20 1.30 1.10 1.20 1.60 2.30 2.40 
 
Low (1) 
 
Medium (2) 
 
High (3) 
 
The nonparametric Kendall-tau-b correlation coefficient analysis was also 
used to examine the impact the length of SRT had on the ratings of stress, 
boredom, driving performance and task completion. The cut-off level for 
significance of p < .05 was chosen for this two-tailed analysis. A significant 
correlation between the rising delay time and the rating for the experienced 
stress was discovered. The correlation coefficient was negative with a value 
of -.683 (n = 7, p = .033). The correlation between the rising delay time and 
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the rating for the experienced boredom is positive and significant with a 
correlation coefficient of .683 (n = 7, p = .033).   
 
Figure 4.16: Rating for drive performance and task completion 
 
 
Table 4.11: Rating for driving performance and task completion 
 
SRT 0 1 3 6 12 20 30 
Task Completion 1.80 1.90 2.10 2.30 2.60 2.70 3.00 
Drive 
Performance 
1.70 1.60 2.00 2.20 2.60 2.60 2.80 
 
To short (1) Convenient length (2)                     Too long (3) 
 
The significant correlation between the rising delay time and the rating for 
the experienced drive performance is positive and very strong with a 
correlation coefficient of .878 (n = 7, p = .006). The correlation between the 
rising delay time and the rating for the experienced task completion was 
significant with a correlation coefficient of .810 (n = 7, p = .011).  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
5.1. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The study was aimed at finding the optimum SRT that will enable users to 
focus as much as possible on the road while attaining an efficient task 
completion time. The utilisation of navigation systems in cars has raised road 
safety concerns since users need to divide their attention between driving 
and the operation of the navigation system. The research project 
investigated the use of such systems, and focused in particular on optimal 
SRTs. The study involved two separate experiments. The first experiment 
included a temporal reproduction task that was conducted in the time 
laboratory. The second experiment took place in a driving simulator. The 
study employed an experimental correlational design. A total of 10 test 
subjects took part in the experiments, and they were mostly students or 
employees at the research institute where the study was conducted.   
 
Seven hypotheses were tested. The first hypothesis concerning the temporal 
reproduction stated that short durations would be overestimated and long 
durations would be underestimated. The second and third hypotheses 
predicted a statistically significant relationship between driving performance 
and the length of the SRT. It was hypothesised that the number of SBs 
would increase under short SRTs. Acceleration and deceleration would 
become more volatile, resulting in a higher SD under short SRTs. Driving 
parameters regarding the position of the car were also expected to be 
negatively affected under the shorter SRTs. The number of SMs and the 
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number of incidences of COL were expected to increase significantly during 
short SRTs.  
 
The fourth hypothesis investigated the impact of the high demand on 
attentional resources during the short SRTs. It was hypothesised that short 
SRTs would force the drivers to switch their focus more often between the 
road and the game monitor. The gaze frequency would therefore increase 
significantly during short SRTs. The average focus time on the game monitor 
should decrease considerably during the short SRTs. The fifth hypothesis 
stated that the distribution of gazes stays constant during the entire waiting 
period. 
 
In the sixth hypothesis it was assumed that the performance with regard to 
correctly remembered items in the memory game would not be influenced by 
the SRT. Hypothesis 7 stated that the subjective state of the test subjects, 
indicating how they personally experienced performing the simulated driving 
task, would be significantly influenced by the duration of the SRT. 
Hypotheses 2 to 6 were analysed using the nonparametric method known as 
Spearman R. Hypothesis 7 was analysed with the Kendall-tau-b rank 
correlation coefficient. All data were processed with the Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 14.0. 
 
 
5.2. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
 
 
5.2.1 Temporal reproduction task 
 
 
The principles of Vierordt’s law were confirmed in the dual-task   
environment of the temporal reproduction task. The hypothesis concerning 
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the temporal reproduction task was verified by the data yielded by the 
experiment. Short durations were overestimated and long durations were 
underestimated as expected according to the principles of Vierordt’s law. The 
secondary task of memorising two symbols before encoding and reproducing 
the various time periods did not drain the subject’s attentional resources to 
such a degree that changes in the time estimation performance could be 
observed. From the findings of the temporal reproduction task it can be 
concluded that a concurrently processed simple memory task did not 
interfere with the process of temporal reproduction to a significant degree. 
The results further indicate that all the test subjects performed within the 
expected parameters indicating that their ability to estimate durations was 
not in any way impaired or altered and made them suitable subjects for the 
experiment in the driving simulator. 
 
 
5.2.2 Effects of SRT duration on breaking, acceleration and deceleration 
 
 
The second hypothesis predicted a statistically significant relationship 
between the number of SBs and the SDPA as well as the SDNA and the 
duration of the SRT. The anticipated effect that driving performance will be 
negatively influenced during short SRTs was confirmed with regard to the 
number of SBs per driven kilometre. This indicated that the high mental load 
placed onto the driver during the short SRT resulted in a less stable and 
fluent drive performance and had a severe impact on braking behaviour.  
 
The negative effect of the short SRTs became apparent when looking at the 
SDPA and SDNA. The correlational analysis also confirmed that the 
acceleration and deceleration became more volatile, resulting in a higher SD 
under short SRTs.  The results of the driving simulator gave strong evidence 
that the short SRTs made it difficult to keep up a constant speed and the 
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acceleration and deceleration became more volatile and abrupt. Such driving 
behaviour could have a negative impact on the flow of traffic and sudden 
unexpected braking can endanger cars driving behind the stopping vehicle.    
 
 
5.2.3 Effects of SRT duration on steering and line crossings 
 
 
The high mental load placed on the driver during the short SRTs seemed to 
have affected variables relating to travelling speed to a greater extent than 
the position of the car on the road. The number of SBs per driven kilometre 
did not vary significantly during the different SRTs. The decrease of COL with 
the increase of the SRT was also not significant. Therefore it can be 
concluded that the short SRTs impacted less severely on the ability to steer 
correctly and to stay in the driving lane. A complicating factor is that the COL 
increase under short SRTs may have been due to the fact that the display 
monitor was mounted to the right of the steering wheel. The head 
movements to this side could have provoked the driver to move the steering 
wheel to the right. The possible effect of this aspect on driving behaviour 
should therefore be investigated in future research.  
 
 
5.2.4. Effects of SRT duration on gaze behaviour  
 
 
The hypotheses with regard to the frequency of gazes and average focus 
time on the game monitor were partly confirmed.  The average focus time on 
the game monitor did not show a decrease to a significant degree during the 
short SRTs, but the gaze frequency was significantly lower during the longer 
SRTs. This may suggest that an automatic switching strategy was performed, 
that was adjusted to each of the SRTs. The average gaze frequency recorded 
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during the 6-s, 12-s, 20-s and 30-s delays lay close to or above the values of 
2 s to 3 s proposed for the duration of temporal integration by Pöppel 
(1997). Temporal integration or perceptual accentuation is proposed to be a 
general principle of the neurocognitive machinery, incorporating all 
perceptual processes into a time window in the range of 2 s to 3 s.  
 
The temporal segmentation mechanism provides a platform for conscious 
activity and makes it possible to search for new information from the 
external or internal environment once the data gathered during the previous 
temporal integration moment have been processed or stored (Schleidt, Eibl-
Eibesfeldt & Pöppel 1987). The gathered data showed that during the short 
SRTs the gaze shift frequency was pushed above the usual operational value, 
which could explain why driving performance with regard to many tested 
parameters declined significantly under these conditions. 
 
The high frequency of gaze shifts can be interpreted as an automatic process 
that splits the attention between the two tasks independently of the 
temporal-estimation abilities of the subjects. It seems that humans operate 
like computers with regard to handling multiple operations at the same time. 
Time-sharing entails that the computer must be able to hold information in 
STM and it requires facilities to store or buffer a considerable number of 
information for concurrent task processing. Computers generally are 
equipped with buffers both for inputs that have not yet been fully processed 
and for outputs that have been planned but not yet carried out, as well as 
various internal buffers. There are suggestions in the literature that humans 
likewise are equipped with a range of memory buffers that enable them to 
employ a ‘buffer and switch’ processing strategy in order to process 
numerous tasks concurrently (Baddeley, 1986).  
 
The expectation that all SRTs would be underestimated, as predicted by the 
attentional resource allocation model (Hemmes, Brown & Kladopoulos, 
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2004), was partly confirmed  since all subjects started to shift their attention 
to the game monitor very soon after the start of the SRT, and they 
significantly underestimated the duration. An interesting observation 
emanating from the data recorded was that many irrelevant gaze shifts 
occurred between the driving scene and the secondary task.  
 
 
5.2.5 Distribution of gazes within the various SRTs    
 
 
The hypothesis stating that the distribution of the gazes would stay constant 
during the entire waiting period had to be refuted. With the help of a 
nonparametric analysis the correlation between the elapsed time and the 
number of gazes to the monitor was analysed. The results indicated that the 
number of gazes continuously increased with the increase in duration and 
was therefore not constant during all the tested SRTs. Except for the 3 s SRT 
the number of gazes increased significantly with time. A stronger rightward 
shift of the gaze distribution was seen during the shorter SRTs.  
 
 
5.2.6 Effects of SRT duration on game performance  
  
 
The hypothesis that the number of inaccurately chosen items in the memory 
game would stay the same with all SRTs was confirmed. The data indicate 
that the performance with regard to the secondary task was not significantly 
affected by the duration of the SRT. The stress experienced by the test 
subjects during the short SRTs did not seem to have affected their 
performance on item memorisation task.  This suggests that a correct 
completion of the secondary task was prioritised by the test subjects, 
confirming the findings of Tsimhoni and Green (2001), who found that there 
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was a trade-off between driving safety and task performance for the benefit 
of task performance. 
 
 
5.2.7 Effects of SRT duration on subjective experience 
 
 
The hypothesis that the subjective state of the test subjects would be 
significantly influenced by the duration of the SRT was confirmed. The 
analysis of the stress and boredom levels showed a significant correlation 
with the duration of the SRT. Short SRTs resulted in a higher rating for stress 
and lower rating for boredom. The ratings of the SRT duration with regard to 
task completion and drive performance were significant. The medium SRTs 
were evaluated as being the most suitable for the test subjects with regard 
to the resulting task completion and driving performance. This indicated that 
the drivers did not find that the medium-length SRTs were a hindrance to the 
completion of the secondary task and that they felt more comfortable driving 
without the time pressure generated by a fast- responding system. 
 
 
5.2.8 Practical implications of research findings 
 
 
The high frequency of gaze shifts found in all the subjects during each tested 
SRT in the driving simulator highlights the importance of the spatial set-up of 
the navigation system monitor. The navigation system should be placed as 
close as possible to the front screen, which would entail that the focus 
change from the road to the monitor is relatively fast and does not involve 
significant head movements. New technologies employed in the next 
generation of navigation systems are already designed to project the screen 
content of navigation systems onto the windscreen.  
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With the help of an on-board computer the video recording of the current 
driving environment and the stored street information are merged to provide 
instructions on the driving direction in the form of three-dimensional arrows. 
On the navigation display the driver is also provided with a recording of the 
external environment and a so-called ‘augmented reality’ that offers the 
same view of the world as when the driver is looking directly at the road. 
Three-dimensional navigation systems employ interactive 3-D computer 
graphics with graphics processors constructed for game consoles and enable 
the production of a virtual space and deliver entire animations of road 
features, buildings and road works. An additional safety feature used in the 
latest navigation systems is a head-up display that ensures that drivers do 
not have to turn their head sideways and can look straight at their route 
(Thiel, 2007). 
 
 
5.2.9 Implications for further research 
 
 
The results of the tests performed in the driving simulator stress the 
importance of a thorough understanding of the hidden costs of multitasking. 
They highlight the need for the development of strategies that boost task 
completion efficiency. Previous research on the effects of multitasking has 
shown that in certain situations the loss of just half a second to task 
switching can make a life-or-death difference. In the case of driving at a 
speed of 60 kilometres while using a cell phone, the distraction caused by 
multitasking can have disastrous consequences. During the short time period 
the driver is not totally focused on driving the car he or she can travel far 
enough to collide with an obstacle that might otherwise have been avoided.  
 
Research exploring the effects of multitasking on productivity such as the 
work done by Meyer and Kieras is aimed at providing an understanding of 
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switching costs.  A thorough understanding of the cognitive tasks involved in 
multitasking and set switching with regard to the allocation of executive 
control processes can help to improve the design and engineering of human-
computer interfaces.  Such sophisticated technologies, especially when 
employed in the area of vehicle and aircraft operation or even air traffic 
control where safety issues have to be considered, need to be adjusted to 
the brain’s capabilitiy to cope with multiple tasks at the same time (Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997). Further research is, however, needed to clarify which types of 
stimulus significantly affect the experience of time. Research also still needs 
to elucidate what exactly the effects of simultaneously encoding from 
different sensory channels are, what additional stress they place on 
attentional resources, and how this may lead to a greater distortion of the 
sense of time.  
 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The main goal of this study was to examine the effect of SRTs on driving 
performance. The study also investigated how the subjects divided their 
visual attention between the road and the monitor, and explored the impact 
of the SRT on memory performance. A further goal of this study was to find 
out how the test subjects personally experienced the simulated driving task 
under the various tested SRT durations.  
 
The study makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the 
impact of navigation systems on driving performance and road safety. It 
shows that fast SRTs are not desirable in on-board devices. The 30-s delay, 
being the longest tested SRT, had the least negative impact on driving 
performance. Short SRT durations were found to correlate significantly with 
an increase in braking and a higher volatility in acceleration and 
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deceleration. Both the number of SMs and the COL show some increase 
under short SRTs. 
 
The study also examined how visual attention was divided.  The results 
indicate that the gaze frequency is significantly higher during the short SRTs 
while the average focus time on the game monitor stays constant. Another 
interesting result was that the number of gazes increased towards the end of 
the SRT.  
 
With regard to the task of item memorisation, the results suggest that the 
stress experienced by test subjects during short SRTs did not have a 
negative impact. A delay of 3 s was rated as the most convenient length by 
the test drivers. Short SRTs resulted in high levels of stress and low levels of 
boredom. 
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1.1. APPENDIX B - Questionnaire 
 
 
Waiting period 
for 
Too short (1) Convenient length 
(2) 
Too long (3) 
Task completion    
Drive 
performance 
   
 
Subjective state Low (1) Medium (2) High (3) 
Stress    
Boredom    
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APPENDIX C – Information and Consent Form 
 
Thank you for being prepared to participate. 
 
My name is Tanja Bauer and I am a postgraduate student undertaking 
research for degree purposes. I would like you to take part in two 
experiments. The resulting data will be treated confidentially and full 
anonymity is insured. It will only be used for research purposes. 
 
The study as will be explaind by me before you begin, involves two seperate 
experiments. In the first experiment you will be ask to reproduce a 
previously given time span. The second experiment will take place in the 
driving simulator. It is possible that the driving simulator will induce vertigo, 
a feeling of dizziness. Should this be the case please inform me, so we can 
stop the test. If you are willing to participate please sign below that you 
voluntarily give your consent to participate in these experiments. If you are 
not willing to participate please feel free to leave and stop the experiment at 
any time. 
 
In return for participating in the study I will offer you personalised results 
from the study that could help you better understand the way in-vehicle 
devices influence your driving. If you do wish to receive results please fill in 
your e-mail address on the space provided below. If you have any questions 
feel free to ask me now or contact me later at: 
 
tanja_x_x@yahoo.com 
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INFORMED CONSENT 
 
If you are participating in the research sign in the space provided below: 
 
I am voluntarily participating in this research and fully understand that the 
results will be kept anonymous and confidential, will be used for research 
purpose only, and will not be made available to any third party. 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you wish to receive personal feedback (Please make a bold tick) 
 
 
Yes  
No  
 
 
Email address: 
 
 
 
